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I.

INTRODUCTION

In two recent decisions, California Court Reporters Ass'n v. Judicial
Council (CCRA I/ and California Court Reporters Ass'n v. Judicial
Council (CCRA I[)' ---collectively "the CCRA decisions"-the First
District Court of Appeal of California appeared to deliver the coup de
grace to using electronic recording in California superior court to make
a verbatim record of proceedings. In CCRA I, the court considered the
Judicial Council rules of court that expressly authorized superior courts
to use sound and video recording devices to make the verbatim record,
the "Electronic Recording Rules,"' and it declared these rules invalid.'
I. 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44 (Ct. App. 1995) [hereinafter CCRA ]].
2. 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529 (Ct. App. 1997) [hereinafter CCRA 11].
3. CAL. R. CT. 33(e), 980.3 (1996) (repealed 1997); CAL. R. Cr. 891, 892 [all
four rules hereinafter the ELECTRONIC RECORDING RULES].
4. See CCRA l, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 56. On January 31, 1997, the Judicial Council
repealed Rules 33(e) and 980.3 and revised Rules 891 and 892. See CAL. R. CT. 33(e),
980.3 (1996) (repealed 1997); CAL. R. Cr. 891,892.
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In CCRA II, the court flatly declared that the Legislature prohibited "the
creation of an official superior court record by electronic means under
5
any circumstances," and affirmed the trial court's injunction that
"restrains the Judicial Council ... from authorizing and from causing the
expenditure of public funds for the maintenance of or creation of a
nonstenographic method and system for preparing the official verbatim
record of superior court proceedings. "6
Despite these explicit holdings, California courts remain uncertain as
to whether they have the authority to use non-stenographic' means to
make a verbatim record of general jurisdiction proceedings' without
express statutory authorization. This uncertainty is made apparent by
the widely divergent responses of the superior courts in Los Angeles and
5. CCRA II, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 53 I (emphasis added).
6. Id. at 530-31. The court wrote, "The trial court correctly interpreted CCRA I to
mean precisely what we held when it crafted paragraphs 2, 4 and 6 of the injunction."
Id. at 531.
7. "Stenography" is defined as "the art or process of writing in shorthand."
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1155 (1989). "Shorthand" is defined
as: "I: a method of writing rapidly by substituting characters, abbreviations, or symbols
for leners, sounds, words, or phrases ... 2: a system or instance of rapid or abbreviated
communication." Id. at 1090.
8. In California, municipal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction while superior
courts are courts of general jurisdiction. See 2 B.E. WITKIN, CAL. PROC. §§ 209-10, 249
(4th ed. 1996). Section 72194.5 of the California Government Code expressly authorizes
a municipal court to use electronic recording whenever an official court reporter is
unavailable. See CAL. Gov'r CODE § 72194.5 (West Supp. 1999). No statute expressly
authorizes or prohibits superior courts from electronically recording their proceedings.
Under Proposition 220, passed by the voters on June 2, 1998, 54 out of 58 counties
abolished their municipal courts and established unified county-wide superior courts.
See Judicial Council of California, News Release: Fifty-Four California Counties Vote to
Unify Trial Courts, Sept. 24, 1999 (visited Jan. 8, 2000) <www.courtinfo.ca.gov/
newsreleases/NR56-99.htm>. Senate Bill 2139, enacted in 1998 to implement trial court
unification in counties that so elect, was intended "to preserve the status quo through the
unification process," including the legal status of electronic recording to make the court
record. Bill Analysis, S.B. 2139, 1997-1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998), available at
California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information (visited Jan. 8, 2000)
<http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97-98/bill/sen/sb_2 I 39_cfa_ 19980830_214559_sen_
floor.him> (emphasis added). Senate Bill 2139 specifies that court unification does not
"change the extent to which court reporter services or electronic reporting may be used
in the courts." Act of Sept. 28, 1998, ch. 931, sec. 507, 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5101,
5308 (West) (S.B. 2139). Therefore, electronk recording is still expressly authorized
under section 72194.5 "in a limited civil case, or a misdemeanor or infraction case."
CAL. Gov'r CODE § 72194.5 (West Supp. 1999). In this Article, the phrase "general
jurisdiction proceeding" refers to a civil proceeding over which only the superior court
had jurisdiction prior to court unification. Section 269(a) of the California Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended under Senate Bill 2139, refers to such a proceeding as a "civil
case other than a limited civil case." CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE§ 269(a) (West Supp. 1999).
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Orange Counties to the CCRA decisions and to a January 1997 Judicial
Council directive prohibiting the expenditure of state funds on electronic
recording to make the official record in superior court.' After years of
fighting to preserve the option of litigants and judges to choose
electronic recording as a cheaper alternative to shorthand, 10 the Los
Angeles Superior Court," at the end of 1997, shut down its sound
recording equipment." Meanwhile, across the county line in Orange
County, thirteen courtrooms 13 continued to videotape general jurisdiction
proceedings financed by county funds and user fees until September 27,
1999." Litigants who chose video recording to make a verbatim record
9. See Memorandum from William C. Vickrey, Administrative Director of the
Courts, Judicial Council of California, to All Presiding and Sole Judges of the Superior
Courts et al. (Jan. 10, 1997) (on file with author).
IO. See William E. Hewitt, Video Court Reporting: A Primer for Trial and
Appellate Judges, 31 JUDGES' J. 2, 4 (1992) ("[W]hen compared with stenographic
reporting, video court reporting produces an instantly available form of the record that is
very inexpensive. A videotape may be purchased from the court for about $20 while a
comparable transcript may cost from $400 to $800.").
11. As late as May 1996, Los Angeles County endorsed the practice of electronic
recording in superior court. See Stephen BirdJebough, Bill Analysis, at 3-4, A.B. 21! 3,
1997-1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996), available at California Legislative Counsel, Bill
Information (visited Jan. 8, 2000) <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bill/asm/
ab_2101-2150/ab_2113_cfa_960506_162617 _asm_comm.html>. This document states:
Los Angeles County reports that four courtrooms have video, and 69 have
audio recording equipment. Restoring these courts to stenography-based
systems would require the hiring of some 90 court reporters, and displacement
of about an equal number of electronic recording monitors and supervisory
personnel. The transition cost would be about $8,000,000. The ongoing added
cost due to the higher salaries paid to stenographers is estimated at $3,900,000
per year.
The Court of Appeal in Los Angeles reports that 588 of the 1892
transcripts which the court received in 1995 were derived in part using audio
or video recordings and that records derived from electronic recording are
indistinguishable from the stenographic records.
Id. at 3-4. As late as July 19%, after the CCRA I decision but before Judge Garcia
issued his injunction that was affirmed in CCRA ll, the Los Angeles Superior Court
"continued to use tape recorders instead of shorthand reporters as a cost-saving
measure." Robert Greene, Supervisors Approve Contracts for Electronic Recording in
Superior Court, ME1RO. NEWS-ENTER., July JI, 1996, at 5 ("The [Los Angeles] Superior
Court and county counsel contend that electronic monitoring continues to be allowed in
court so long as neither party requests a stenographic court reporter.").
12. The lone exception is Judge Kurt Lewin, who continues to use electronic
recording. See Margaret A. Jacobs, Stenographers Fight for Their Day (Jobs) in Court,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1999, at BI (calling Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Lewin
"one of a handful of state judges who have persisted in using tape recording despite
persistent protests from the [Judicial Council] and the stenographers' trade group").
13. See Letter from Pat Hill, Executive Director, Civil Operations and Special
Services, Orange County Superior Court, to author (Aug. 13, 1999) (on file with author).
The practice in these 13 courtrooms is to use "electronic recording in general jurisdiction
civil cases when neither party objects." Id.
14. See Memorandum from Kathleen E. O'Leary, Presiding Judge, Orange County
Superior Court, to Judges Bauer et al. (Sept. 21, 1999) (on file with author). A telephone
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paid $80.00 for a full day of video recording instead of $357 .00 for a full
day of shorthand reporting."
The Orange County Superior Court pulled the plug on electronic
recording to make the "official verbatim record" in response to a "formal
request" by the Judicial Council, which was contained in a September
15, 1999 letter from the Administrative Director of the Courts, William
Vickrey, to the Presiding Judge of Orange County Superior Court,
Kathleen O'Leary." In that letter, the Administrative Director stated that
Orange County Superior Court's practice of funding electronic recording
through local user fees-not state funds allocated by the Judicial
Council-violated the trial court's injunction in CCRA II restraining the
Judicial Council from "authorizing or causing the expenditure of 'public
funds "'17 to support electronic recording to make the official record."
survey of the superior courts in each county in California, conducted by research
assistants John Palmer and Richard Helms, revealed that superior courts in an
overwhelming majority of counties do not electronically record general jurisdiction
proceedings. This survey was completed on September 1, 1999, before the Orange
County Superior Court terminated its use of electronic recording to make an official
record in general jurisdiction and felony proceedings on September 27, 1999. According
to the survey, superior courts of the following counties do not currently employ
electronic recording to make a verbatim record (those with an asterisk having used
electronic recording as part of an electronic recording demonstration project-discussed
infra notes 85-96-that terminated on January 1, 1994): Alameda,* Alpine, Butte,
Calaveras, Colusa, Contra Costa,* Del Norte, El Dorado, Fresno, Humboldt, Imperial,
Inyo, Kem, Lake, Los Angeles,* Madera, Marin, Mariposa, Mendocino, Merced,
Modoc, Mono, Monterey, Napa, Nevada, Placer, Plumas, Riverside,* San Benito, San
Diego,* San Francisco, San Joaquin,* San Luis Obispo, San Mateo,* Santa Barbara,
Santa Clara,• Santa Cruz,• Shasta, Sierra, Siskiyou, Solano,• Sonoma, Stanislaus,
Sutter, Tehama, Trinity, Tulare, Tuolumne, Ventura, Yolo, and Yuba. The Lassen
County Superior Court tapes proceedings for the clerk and the judge; parties can obtain a
copy for $10. In the superior courts of Amador and Kings counties, the court has the
discretion to grant the petition of the parties to electronically record proceedings. The
use of electronic recording in San Barnardino County Superior Court varies by
department. Until September 27, 1999, 13 courtrooms in Orange County Superior Court
used electronic recording to make the verbatim record if neither party objected. The
researchers could not connect with court personnel in Glenn County. Survey results are
on file with the author.
15. See Orange County Superior Court Fee Schedule (visited Jul. 14, 1999)
<http:www.oc.ca.gov/superior/rcdfees.htm> (effective Jan. 1, 1999).
16. See Letter from William C. Vickrey, Administrative Director of the Courts,
Judicial Council of California, to Kathleen E. O'Leary, Presiding Judge, Orange County
Superior Court (Sept. 15, 1999) (on file with author).
17. Id. at 2 (paraphrasing CCRA II, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529,531 (Ct. App. 1997)).
18. See Letter from William C. Vickrey, supra note 16, at 1-2. Vickrey wrote:
Your letter states that the court is paying for electronic recording with
funds other than the monies allocated by the Judicial Council, including funds
from the sale of videotapes and a portion of filing fees received by the court.
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Sacramento County Superior Court still uses electronic recording in
Family Law, and Civil Law, and Motion proceedings, including general
jurisdiction cases."
This Article explores the authority of superior courts to use electronic
recording technology to make a verbatim record of superior court
proceedings-without express statutory authorization-in the aftermath
of the CCRA decisions. Rather than just arguing that the CCRA
decisions were wrongly decided, 20 this Article explores ways to narrowly
construe the CCRA opinions to permit superior courts and their litigants
to use rapidly evolving electronic recording technologies as an
alternative to traditional stenographic court reporting.
Part II articulates the challenging statutory interpretation problem
raised by the CCRA decisions. The California Court Reporters
Association (CCRA) maintains a powerful lobby in the California
Legislature that has blocked numerous efforts to update nineteenth
century court reporting statutes by expressly authorizing the courts to
Your letter asks that we let you know if we believe that this use of funds
violates the council's directives on this issue.
As you know, the council has issued a directive that "superior courts may
not use any funds allocated by the Judicial Council for electronic recording to
make the official verbatim record, except in limited civil cases, misdemeanors,
and infractions, as allowed by Government Code section 72194.5." The
council's directive also states that this prohibition applies even if the amounts
involved are small, "and even if the funds are recouped through charges to the
litigants or payments by a county or other source."
Based on your description of your court's activities in this area, we
conclude that those activities are of necessity linked with activities paid for by
state trial court funding, and, hence, are not in compliance with the council's
directive.
In addition, please note that the judgment states that the council is
enjoined from authorizing or causing the expenditure of "public funds" for the
prohibited uses of electronic recording.
Thus, the use of any public funds for these purposes is inconsistent with
the judgment, and the council could not and does not authorize or approve of
your court's use of public funds for these purposes.
Id. (citation omitted).
I 9. See Telephone Interview with Mike Roddy, Chief Executive Officer,
Sacramento County Superior Court (Nov. 30, 1999).
20. For a detailed discussion of the errors in the CCRA opinions, see generally
Glenn S. Koppel, When Push-Comes-to-Shove Between Court Rule and Statute: The
Role of Judicial Interpretation in Court Administration, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. I 03
[hereinafter Koppel, Push-Comes-to-Shove]. The article argues that the CCRA court
made two significant errors. First, the court interpreted too broadly the text of article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution, which defines the Judicial Council's rulemaking
power. See id. at I 40-70. Second, the court interpreted too broadly the text of various
applicable statutes. See id. at 170-85. The CCRA I court had characterized these statutes
as comprising a "statutory scheme ... [that] suggest[s] that the Legislature implicitly
intended that [the official] record be made by certified shorthand reporters rather than by
electronic recording." CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 51 (Ct. App. 1995).
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use twentieth century electronic court recording technologies in general
21
jurisdiction proceedings. A cursory reading of these statutes makes it
appear as though the Legislature has thoughtfully considered-and
rejected-the use of newer, cutting edge technologies to make the court
record. Part II then surveys the statutory and case law landscape to lay a
foundation for Part III' s analysis of the current legal status of electronic
recording in California superior courts. Finally, Part II explores the
unintended role played by the advent of state court funding22
accomplished by a 1997 statute -in shutting down electronic recording
in Los Angeles Superior Court and thereby undermining judicial selfgovemance.
Part III analyzes the current legal status of electronic recording in
superior courts in California. The Article concludes in Part IV that the
practice of videotaping superior court proceedings in Orange County
was not inconsistent with applicable statutes. This Article steers clear of
the debate whether shorthand or electronic recording is the better
method for making the verbatim record. Studies indicate that there is no
superior method; each has its plusses and minuses." Indeed, there is no
perfectly reliable means of making a verbatim record. As observed by
the Second District Court of Appeal in 1998, "In fact, the battle over use
of certified shorthand reporters versus electronic recording appears to be
24
more political than factual. "

21. See Dan Walters, Luddites in the Court: Are Reporters Losing Their War
Against Machines?, L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 21, 1993, at 6. The reporter stated:
The California Court Reporters Association has become one of the
Capitol's most effective single-purpose lobbying groups, [its] lone goal being
to keep tape out of the state's courtrooms.
Frank Murphy, a one-time Republican assemblyman from Santa Cruz
who has lobbied for the court reporters for years, is famous for his ability to
sniff out and kill any bill that would bring electronic recording to the
courtroom.
Id.
22. See Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding and Improvement Act of 1997, ch.
850, 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4737 (West) (A.B. 233).
23. See Memorandum from Rae Lovko and Susan Myers, National Center for
State Courts, Institute for Court Management (Mar. 15, 1994) (on file with author)
("[The findings reported in 20 evaluations of electronic court reporting] reveal that while
no technology is unquestionably superior in all respects or under all circumstances, audio
recording and video recording are viable court reporting methods."); see also
INFORMATION SERVICE OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, SUMMARY OF
LITERATURE ON ELECTRONIC COURT REPORTING ( 1994).
24. People v. Turner, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 745 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Don J.
DeBenedictis, Excuse Me, Did You Get All That?, 79 A.B.A. J., May 1993, at 84).

53

This Article addresses the key question: Who should decide what role
technology should play (1) in court administration generally, and (2)
more specifically, in making the court record?25 The decision should not
be made by persons with a vested interest in status quo technologypersons who, by virtue of their entrenched position in that technology,
have the political power in the Legislature to take away the courts' and
litigants' power to choose.

II.

A.

THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF ELECTRONIC RECORDING IN
CALIFORNIA COURTS

The Government Failure Problem: Court Reporters Have
Used Legislative Lobbying Leverage to "Fossilize"
by Statute the Shorthand Method, Thereby
Depriving the Courts and the Public of Their
Power to Choose New Technologies
to Make the Record

Technology for preparing a verbatim record of court proceedings has
come a long way from the 1860s when routine court reporting made its
debut in American courtrooms.
At that time, the first court
stenographers used the quill pen" to take down notes in shorthand. 27
25. This Article's answer corresponds to that offered in the Final Report of the
Legislature's Electronic Recording Project Advisory Committee-ironically, a document
written by persons appointed at the insistence of the California Court Reporters
Association. See SENATE COMM, ON JUDICIARY, ELECTRONIC REcORDINGNIDEO
TAPING-EXPERIMENTAL USE IN SUPERIOR COURT 5, 1985-1986 Leg .• Reg. Sess. (Cal
1986) (A.B. 825); see also Hearing on A.B. 825 Before the Assembly Comm. on
Judiciary, 1985-1986 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995). The Final Report of the Legislature's
Electronic Recording Project Advisory Committee concluded: "In civil litigation, a
litigant should be able to choose the record making system at the litigant's cost. . . . In
civil litigation, it should be the litigant's decision which method (ER or CSR) will be
used to make the record." ELECTRONIC RECORDING PROJECT ADVISORY COMMITTEE,
FINAL REPORT OF THE ELECTRONIC RECORDING PROJECT ADVISORY COMMITIBE 1, 7
(1992) (on file with author).
26. See Harry M. Scharf, The Court Reponer, 10 J. LEGAL HIST, 191, 209 (1989).
Scharf s article includes the following quotation:
The early shorthand writer, of course, wrote with quill pens. Of these he
carried into court with him a goodly supply in a leather case, and also an ink
bottle in a metal case covered with leather. Part of the equipment of his
chambers was a proper penknife and a hone, for he had to cut his pens to suit
his hand.
,
Id. (quoting TREMAINE WRIGHT, THE Two ANGELS); see also Brian Miller, Coun
Reponing: From Stenography to Technology, Gov'T TECH. I (Mar. 1996)
<http://www.govtech.net/publications/gt/1996/marlcourts/courts.shtm> ("[The court
reporters'] tools have changed over the centuries from inkwells to stenograph machines,
and more recently to today's computer-aided transcription, or CAT.").
27. Stenographers were rarely used as court reporters to make a verbatim record of
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During the last twenty years, sophisticated electronic court reporting
technology has evolved rapidly. Currently, court proceedings are
routinely recorded in many American courtrooms" through the medium
of multi-track audio and videotape," as well as cutting-edge, digital
technology.'° Moreover, voice recognition computer technology that
will translate voice to text is on the horizon.' 1 As courts throughout the
trial proceedings in American courtrooms until the mid-nineteenth century. See Jim
Haviland, Philander Deming's Role, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 12, 1982, at 15 ("Until just after
the Civil War, testimony wasn't recorded in trials. This led to considerable wrangling
over the different recollections of what had been said by witnesses in court.").
28. According to a 1993 survey prepared jointly by the Conference of State Court
Administrators and the National Center for State Courts, 45 state court systems, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the federal courts either "allow" or "require" the
use of audio tape to record some or all trial proceedings. Video tape is "allowed" in 17
state jurisdictions, "prohibited" in 7 state jurisdictions, and "experimental for some or all
types of cases" in 10 state jurisdictions and in the federal courts. DA vm B. ROTTMAN ET
AL., STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 1993, tbl.31 (1995).
29. Thirteen courtrooms in Orange County Superior Court are equipped with
videotape recording equipment. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. William E.
Hewitt, Senior Court Research Associate for the National Center for State Courts in
Williamsburg, Virginia, describes video court reporting as follows:
Video court reporting captures the sights and sounds in a courtroom on
videotape, without a camera operator. In a typical courtroom five to seven
cameras and about the same number of microphones are required to record the
proceedings. The cameras are mounted on the walls or ceilings. They are
unobtrusive-no special lighting is required ....
The cameras are "sound activated" and controlled by a computerized
mixing device. This "brain" of the system ... adjusts the sound level of the
audio output and determines which microphone and camera position will have
precedence at any one time. It allows the camera to switch between speakers.
A video court reporting system includes a "date/time generator," which
displays the current date and time on the monitor and on the tape. The display
of the date and the time of day is used in place of transcript page and line
numbers to locate and refer to portions of the record.
Hewitt, supra note 10, at 3.
30. A commentator explains:
[Digital technology permits m]icrophones at the podiums, the judge's chair,
attorneys' tables, and in the ceiling [to] record high-quality digital sound
straight to a computer hard drive on separate tracks. Court reporters register
who is speaking with a keystroke, creating an annotated log that's stored with
the audio record. When a judge asks for a statement to be replayed for a court,
a few keystrokes accomplish the task in seconds.
John Southers!, Digital Court Recording: Trial Without Error, CT. TECH. BULL., Mar.Apr. 1998, at 1, 8.
31. See April C. Argtegian, The Technology-Augmented Court Record (visited Jan.
8, 2000) <http://www.ncsc.dni.us/ncsc/tis/ctc5/203.htm>.
Argtegian wrote in
preparation for the Fifth National Court Technology Conference (CTC5) of the National
Center for State Courts:
Does the future hold automated voice and speech recognition systems in
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nation seek to infuse court operations with cost-cutting, cutting-edge
technology to cope with tight fiscal restraints, the court reporting
profession resists, with varying success, non-stenographic inroads on the
court record."
The California Legislature has proven to be a particularly hospitable
environment for court reporters to promote their professional interests.
which the reporter's duties are primarily to assure the proper functioning of the
system? Logic suggests that this is likely, but technology advances in this area
have been slower than anticipated. The task necessary to achieve an
automated system is tremendous. We must have a computer that not only can
recognize a huge number of words but which can handle similar sounding
words, accents, colds, and unusual speaking patterns-to mention only a few
factors. Professor Lederer, the Director of Courtroom 21, has predicted that
science and engineering will one day achieve this goal, and that then reporters
will likely expand their duties to become courtroom technologists as well.
This may be, but the task facing voice and speech recognition specialists is so
great that even if he is correct, that time will not likely come for many years
indeed.
Id; see also Frederick K. Grittner, The Recording on Appeal: Minnesota's Experience
with Videotaped Proceedings, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 593, 607 (1993). Grittner
writes:
The continued development of technology should be treated as a
fundamental assumption.
Voice recognition computer systems appear
attainable. Voice-activated computers are now marketed to doctors and to
attorneys as a means of bypassing secretaries and transcribers. Although these
systems require a user to dictate hundreds of phrases so the machine can
analyze the voice pattern, engineers are continuing to improve speech
recognition.
Id.
32. Court reporter lobbying is a national phenomenon. See Jacobs, supra note 12,
at B 1 ("Last year alone, the National Court Reporters Association spent $320,000 on
lobbying."). Such lobbying is a manifestation of a larger problem of the erosion of
judicial independence by political interference in court administration, the rule-making
process, and judicial decision-making. See John M. Greacen, Court Rules and
Technology (visited July 15, 1999) <http://www.ncsc.dni.us/ncsc/tis/ctc5/106.htm>.
Greacen wrote in preparation for the Fifth National Court Technology Conference
(CTC5) of the National Center for State Courts:
[T]he determination of California's court reporters to fight by every means at
their disposal the introduction of electronic recording-which threatened the
existence of their profession-is instructive. Other states should anticipate
strong opposition from court reporters to the introduction of electronic and
videotape recording or the use of voice recognition software not only to record
testimony but to translate it into written form. Perhaps we should be prepared
for the possibility that other groups of court employees may organize to oppose
other technologies that they perceive as threatening to their job security. For
instance, file clerks might oppose electronic filing technology because there
would no longer be any paper files for them to manage. Microfilm operators
might join them. When we develop advanced court security technologies, we
may anticipate opposition from bailiffs if their jobs are threatened.
Id; see also Hewitt, supra note 10, at 5 ("From a political perspective, the disadvantages
[of video court reporting] are obvious: significant resistance and controversy generally
ensue where court reporters are well organized and influential, as they are in many states
and cities.").
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California is one of the few remaining states where the legislature plays
the dominant rulemaking role in court administration, practice, and
procedure." The highly effective court reporter lobby34 has caused the
defeat of virtually every bill that would have expressly authorized the
electronic recording of superior court proceedings." California statutes,
derived from a single progenitor statute enacted in 1861, have-with
36
minor exceptions -failed to keep pace with rapidly evolving
33. See Greacen, supra note 32. Greacen writes:
California is one of only a handful of states that takes the federal view that the
legislature has plenary authority to enact court rules if it wishes to do so. The
rule-making authority of the California Judicial Council is limited to rules
consistent with stale statute. Most states take the contrary view-that rule
making is the exclusive province of the judiciary.
Id. New York is another state where legislature and courts concurrently exercise rulemaking authority. See Bloom v. Crosson, 590 N.Y.S.2d 328, 330 (App. Div. 1992)
("Under our State constitutional scheme, the authority to regulate the courts is split
between the Legislature and the Chief Judge."). Heavy lobbying by the New York State
Court Reporters Association ("NYSCRA") in the New York State Legislature has kept
electronic recording to an "experimental" program that began in 1992. In 1997, the
Legislature extended the electronic recording experiment two more years, rejecting the
court administrators' recommendation "to give the court system expanded authority to
use tape recorders in place of court stenographers in all state-funded trial courts." Daniel
Wise, Expanded Use of Tape Recorders Is Urged, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 10, 1997, at I; see
Gary Spencer, Legislature Budgets $952.2 Million/or Courts, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 5, 1997, at
I.
34. See Tom Dresslar, The Bill Rejecters: In Sacramento, Court Reporters Swat
Away Endeavors to Change Their Status, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 3, 1993, at 1. Dresslar
writes:
[T]he CCRA no doubt would rank with the greatest shot blockers in history.
The record shows that when it comes to legislation detrimental to its members'
financial and professional interests, the association can kill with the best of
them.
Assembly Judiciary Committee Chairman Phil Isenberg puts a slightly
different spin on the historical record.
"The Legislature has kowtowed to court reporters in a shameless
fashion," said the Sacramento Democrat who has lost several duels to what he
calls the "court reporter monopoly."
Id.
35. The following are two exceptions: (I) the statutory authorization of electronic
recording in municipal court, see infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text, and (2) the
electronic recording authorized in selected superior courts under a demonstration project,
which expired in January 1994. See infra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
36. Court reporting statutes have been updated to reflect technological advances in
shorthand. For example, "[t]ranscription by typewriter or other printing machine was
authorized in 1903." CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 269 historical note (West 1982) (current
version at CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 269 (West Supp. 1999)). The Legislature added
subsection (c) to section 269 of the California Code of Civil Procedure in order to reflect
advances in computer-aided transcription technology. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE§ 269
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developments in electronic recording technology because the court
reporting profession has used its considerable leverage in the Legislature
to protect its vested interest in shorthand.
Until the use of electronic recording technology to prepare the court
record became a fact of life in American courtrooms during the last two
decades, shorthand was the only available means to make a verbatim
record. The history of modem courtroom recording goes back to the
mid-nineteenth century, when a small cadre of stenographers were able
to adapt shorthand to the verbatim reporting of court proceedings."
Beginning in the 1860s, legislatures enacted statutes that authorized
courts to appoint official court reporters to take advantage of this
cutting-edge phenomenon." When these first court reporting statutes
were enacted, the court reporting profession was in its infancy and
qualified court stenographers were scarce-especially in frontier
California." California's first court reporting statute was enacted in
1861 40 following the enactment of a similar statute in New York State in
1860.41 While no legislative history survives, it is reasonable to infer
that the problem addressed by the original 1861 California court
reporting statute was the lack of assured, quality access by judges and
litigants to the only available technology to make a verbatim recordshorthand court reporting. In California, this nineteenth century statute
remains on the books remarkably intact despite the emergence of
twenty-first century non-stenographic court reporting alternatives.
Having prevailed in the legislature, the California Court Reporters
Association later scored two big victories in the judicial arena. First, it
persuaded the First District Court of Appeal to strike down the Judicial
Council's Electronic Recording Rules. Accordingly, the court's 1995
decision in California Court Reporters Ass'n v. Judicial Council of
California (CCRA It' held that these rules of court were "inconsistent

(West Supp. 1999).
37. See generally Oswald M.T. Ratteray, Verbatim Reporting Comes of Age, 56
JUDICATURE 368 (1973) (discussing the origins of official court reporting in the 1860s).
38. See JULIUS ENSIGN ROCKWELL, THE TEACHING, PRACTICE, AND LITERATURE OF
SHORTHAND 46-47 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office 1884).
39. See Ratteray, supra note 37, at 368 ("Many transcripts of this [early to mid19th century] period ... show evidence of considerable condensation and gaps in the
reporter's notes that were subsequently filled in. In many instances the reporters were
probably just not skilled enough to record every word.") (footnote omitted). A writer for
an 1884 Department of the Interior survey on shorthand reporting in the United States
wrote: "[S]ince the introduction of phonography in 1845, ... the dissemination of the art
has gone steadily forward, and its use during the last five years has been greatly on the
increase." ROCKWELL, supra note 38, at 23.
40. See Act of May 17, 1861, ch. 434, 1861 Cal. Stat. 497.
41. See ROCKWELL, supra note 38, at 46.
42. 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44 (Ct. App. 1995).
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with statute" and, therefore, their promulgation exceeded the power of
the Judicial Council under article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution. 43 Two years later, the first appellate district issued its
second opinion in the California Court Reporters litigation, CCRA Il, 44
which upheld a sweeping judgment by Judge Garcia of the Alameda
County Superior Court issued pursuant to CCRA I." The superior court
judgment not only declared the Judicial Council's Electronic Recording
Rules invalid, but it further declared that "the use of nonstenographic
methods for producing the OFFICIAL verbatim record of superior court
proceedings are contrary to the intent of the Legislat[ure] .',46
Accordingly, the superior court enjoined the Judicial Council and the
Alameda County Superior Court from "authorizing and from causing the
expenditure of public funds for the maintenance of or creation of a
nonstenographic method and system for preparing the official verbatim
record of superior court proceedings.'"''
Pursuant to the injunction, the Judicial Council, in January 1997,
directed "each superior court not to expend any of the upcoming [fiscal
year] 96-97 third quarter state funding distribution on the maintenance or
creation of nonstenographic methods for preparing the official verbatim
record of superior court proceedings.'''' Two years later, the council
expansively interpreted the portion of the injunction that restrained the
council from "authorizing and from causing the expenditure of public
funds" to maintain electronic recording to include local user fees and
county funds that are not included in the state funds allocated by the
Judicial Council to local superior courts."

43. Id. at 56 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6).
44. CCRA II, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529 (Ct. App. 1997).
45. See id. at 531.
46. California Court Reporters Ass'n v. Judicial Council, No. 728173-6 (Alameda
County Sup. Ct. Nov. I, 1996) Gudgment of Hon. David A. Garcia, Judge of the
Alameda County Superior Court).
47. Id.
48. Memorandum from William C. Vickrey to All Presiding and Sole Judges of
the Superior Courts et al., supra note 9, at 2.
49. By letter dated January 14, 1999, the council directed that "superior courts may
not use any funds allocated by the Judicial Council for electronic recording to make the
official verbatim record." Letter from William C. Vickrey to Kathleen E. O'Leary,
supra note 16, at I. The prohibition was to apply "even if the funds are recouped
through charges to the litigants or payments by a county or other source." Id.
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B.

The Statutes: California's "Permissive" Statutory Structure
for Making a Verbatim Record Dates Back to the
Original 1861 Court Reporting Statute
1.

The 1861 Statute

The original court reporting statute,'0 from which current code sections
are derived,' 1 was permissive in that it only authorized, but did not
require, courts to appoint shorthand reporters and did not require that
courts maintain a verbatim record. This statute gave judges the option to
hire court reporters and gave judges and litigants the option to request a
verbatim record and a readily available means for creating that record."
The 1861 statute sprang from a public-regarding" purpose to createnot to restrict-technological options for courts and litigants who chose
to make a verbatim record. The original legislative decision to authorize
the courts to appoint official court reporters was not a decision to
exclude other, non-existent, means of making a verbatim record." Nor
50. See Act of May 17, 1861, ch. 434, 1861 Cal. Stat. 497.
51. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 269(a), 273 (West Supp. 1999); CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 69941 (West 1997). For further discussion of these statutes, see infra notes 6165 and accompanying text.
52. The Act states in part:
SECTION I. The District Judge of each of the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh,
Tenth, Twelfth, and Fifteenth, Judicial Districts, is hereby authorized to
appoint a competent Short Hand Reporter, who shall, at the request of either
party in a civil case, or in criminal cases, triable in the District Court, at the
request of the court, take down in short hand, the rulings of the court, the
exceptions taken, and the testimony, and shall within five days after the trial of
such case, write out the same in plain, legible, Jong, handwriting, and file it,
together with the original short handwriting, with the Clerk of the court in
which the cause was tried.
SEC. 2. Such report, written out in long handwriting, as aforesaid, shall be
deemed prima facie a correct statement of the evidence and proceedings
therein contained.
Ch. 434, 186 I Cal. Stat. 497, 497-98 (first and second emphasis added).
53. The term "public-regarding" is attributed to Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional
Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TUL. L. REV. 849,868 (1980). A
subsequent article explains the concept as follows: "If the statute in question is the result
of a reified, deliberative congressional process in which conceptions of the public good
were considered, then the statute is public-regarding. If, however, the statute simply
represents legislative acquiescence to raw political power, it is not public-regarding."
Jonathan R. Macy, Prorrwting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 229 n.29 (1986).
54. A previous article argues that the CCRA I court, through expansive statutory
interpretation, transformed what began as public-regarding statutes into rent-seeking
statutes that grant a monopoly to a powerful special interest group to make the record of
superior court proceedings. See Koppel, Push-Comes-to-Shove, supra note 20, at I 7072, 174.
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was the decision intended to preempt the Judicial Council-which did
not exist until 1926-from exercising its own rulemaking power over
court administration to authorize superior courts to use emerging
technologies as they evolved."
The 1861 Legislature apparently rejected a mandatory approach that
would have required a shorthand reporter to take down stenographic
notes of every proceeding. 56 California emulated New York's original
court reporter statute, enacted on April 16, 1860, that provided for the
selective verbatim reporting of court proceedings. However, while New
York's Legislature abandoned this permissive approach three years later,
amending its statute to require court regorters to take "full stenographic
notes of all proceedings in every trial," California did not. California's
55. The Judicial Council and the Legislature exercise concurrent rulemaking
authority over practice, procedure, and court administration. The Council's rulemaking
authority is limited to promulgating rules that are "not inconsistent with statute" and is,
therefore, secondary to that of the Legislature. CAL. CONST., art. VI, § 6. CCRA I
broadly interpreted "not inconsistent with statute" to mean, in effect, consistent with an
unarticulated legislative intent suggested by an implied statutory scheme. See CCRA I,
46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 51 (Ct. App. 1995). The court wrote:
[W]e conclude that when evaluating whether a rule of court is "not inconsistent
with statute" ... , a court must determine the Legislature's intent behind the
statutory scheme that the rule was intended to implement and measure the
rule's consistency with that intent. ...
. . . We must determine whether the statutory scheme addresses the
making of the official record in such a manner as to suggest that the
Legislature implicitly intended that this record be made by certified shorthand
reporters rather than by electronic recording.
Id. CCRA I's broad construction of "not inconsistent with statute" invites courts to
presume legislative preemption of judicial authority over court administration and,
thereby, threatens to undermine judicial self-governance that is the key to judicial
independence in the twenty-first century. See Koppel, Push-Comes-to-Shove, supra note
20, at 145, 149, 160-62, 164.
56. The text of a pre-enactment version of the 1861 statute read as follows:
Section 2: The duties of such Reporter shall be to attend in person the sittings
of the District Court within his district, and to take down in stenographic or
phonographic hand during the trial of every cause in such Court the testimony
of the witnesses and the proceedings had pending the trial of such cause; and
immediately thereafter, to write out at length in a plain, legible hand a correct
and complete report of such testimony, and all the proceedings in the cause,
state the testimony as nearly as possible in the exact words of the witnesses, or
interpreter as given at the trial, and with like exactings the questions asked the
witnesses; objections stated; rulings of the Court, and the exceptions taken.
Such report when prepared shall be filed with the papers in the cause, and shall
constitute a part of the record thereof.
Act of May 17, 1861, ch. 434, § 2 (handwritten draft) (emphasis added) (on file with
author).
57. ROCKWELL supra note 38, at 46 (emphasis added).
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current court reporter statutes retain this essential permissive structure
while New York's court reporter statutes retain their mandatory
structure."
2.

Current Statutory Law Pertaining to Court Reporting Authorizes,
but Does Not Require, the Appointment of Official Court
Reporters and the Preparation of a Verbatim Record

No statute expressly mandates that an official superior court record be
made by shorthand reporters nor expressly prohibits using nonstenographic means to make a verbatim record." Current statutory law
does not even require the creation of a verbatim court record."'
Moreover, section 69941 of the California Government Code continues
to authorize-but not require-superior courts to appoint official
reporters." Section 269(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure
continues to confer upon the parties and the court the option to createor not create-a verbatim record.62 In the event a superior court appoints
58. See N.Y. Jun. LAW§ 295 (McKinney 1983) ("Each stenographer ... must take
full stenographic notes of the testimony and of all other proceedings in each cause tried
or heard.") (emphasis added). The California Legislature knows how to require official
reporters to prepare verbatim records when it wants to because it has done so in juvenile
court hearings conducted by a juvenile court judge. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 347
(West 1998) ("At any juvenile court hearing conducted by a juvenile court judge, an
official court reporter shall ... take down in shorthand all the testimony and all of the
statements and remarks of the judge and all persons appearing at the hearing ....")
(emphasis added).
59. The First District Court of Appeal conceded these two propositions in CCRA I,
citing an earlier decision involving the Los Angeles CCRA for support. See CCRA I, 46
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 51 (citing Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n v. Superior Court,
37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341, 345 (Ct. App. 1995)). Nevertheless, the court went beyond express
statutory language to inquire whether "the statutory scheme addresses the making of the
official record in such a manner as to suggest that the Legislature implicitly intended that
this record be made by certified shorthand reporters rather than by electronic
recording." Id. (emphasis added).
60. In California, settled or agreed statements may be used in lieu of verbatim
transcripts as part of the appellate record. See CAL. R. CT. 6, 7.
61. Section 69941 reads:
The judge or judges of any superior court may appoint a competent
phonographic reporter, or as many such reporters as there are judges, to be
known as official reporter or reporters of such court, and such pro tempore
official reporters as the convenience of the court may require. The reporters
shall hold office during the pleasure of the appointing judge or judges.
CAL. GoV'TCODE § 69941 (West 1997) (emphasis added).
62. Section 269(a) reads:
The official reporter of a superior court ... shall, at the request of either
party, or of the court in a civil case other than a limited civil case, and on the
order of the court, the district attorney, or the attorney for the defendant in a
felony case, take down in shorthand all testimony, objections made, rulings of
the court, exceptions taken, all arraignments, pleas, and sentences of
defendants in felony cases, arguments of the prosecuting attorney to the jury,
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an official reporter, statutes prescribe the duties of that official reporter
and regulate administrative matters like fees and salary.6' Consistent
with the text of the 1861 statute, the duty of an official court reporter of
a superior court to "take down in shorthand all the testimony" arises
only if his services are requested by either party or the court. 64 The basic
"permissive" -option-creating-statutory structure enacted in 1861
remains essentially intact in California's contemporary court reporting
statutes. Also consistent with the 1861 statute, the court reporter's
certified transcript constitutes "prima facie evidence of [the] testimony
and proceedings" in the case.6'
and all statements and remarks made and oral instructions given by the judge.

If directed by the court, or requested by either party, the official reporter shall,

within such reasonable time after the trial of the case as the court may
designate, write the transcripts out, or the specific portions thereof as may be
requested, in plain and legible longhand, or by typewriter, or other printing
machine, and certify that the transcripts were correctly reported and
transcribed, and when directed by the court, file the transcripts with the clerk
of the court.
CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE§ 269(a) (West Supp. 1999) (emphasis added).
63. Originally, in 1861, fees were not fixed by statute but negotiated privately
between the Reporter and the parties. See Act of May 17, 1861, ch. 434, 1861 Cal. Stat.
497, 498 ("SEC. 3. Such Reporter shall receive such compensation for his services as
may be agreed upon between the said Reporter and the parties, or counsel, in the cause,
and in case of failure to agree, between the said parties, then the amount may be fixed by
the court."). Fees are now fixed by statute under the following sections of the California
Code of Government: section 69947 ("Except in counties where a statute provides
otherwise, the official reporter shall receive for his services the fees prescribed in this
article."), section 69948 (fee for reporting contested cases), section 69948.5 (rate of
compensation for court reporters in Modoc County), section 69949 (reporting defaults or
uncontested matters), section 69950 (transcription: originals and copies), section 69951
(transcription in civil cases; additional fee), and section 69954 (compensation for
transcripts prepared with computer assistance). CAL. Gov'r CODE §§ 69947, 69948,
69948.5, 69949, 69950, 69951, 69954 (West 1997). In 1993, section 68086 of the
California Code of Government was amended to authorize superior courts to charge the
parties in a civil case, who use a court reporter's services, a user fee equal to the "actual
cost of providing that service." CAL. Gov'r CODE § 68086 (West Supp. 1999). In
addition to fees, court reporters are paid salaries that are also fixed by statute. See CAL.
Gov'rCODE §§ 69994.2-70063 (West 1997).
64. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 269(a) (West Supp. 1999).
65. CAL. C1v. PROC. CODE § 273 (West Supp. 1999). An earlier draft of the
section of the 1861 statute from which section 273 is derived had provided that the court
reporter's "report" of testimony was, "for the purposes of making a statement upon
motion for new trial or appeal ... conclusive of the facts therein stated." Act of May 17,
1861, ch. 434, § 4 (handwritten draft) (emphasis added) (on file with author). The word
"conclusive" presumably would have foreclosed a party on appeal from disputing the
accuracy of the court reporter's transcript. The statutory presumption of accuracy
created by section 273 can be rebutted by an electronic recording of the same
proceedings. See infra note 250.
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The only express statutory authorization for the electronic recording of
court proceedings is limited to municipal courts-but only where an
official reporter is "unavailable."66 However, in the fifty-four out of
fifty-eight counties that have voted to unify their trial courts under
Proposition 220, municipal courts no longer exist.67 For this reason,
section 72194.5 of the California Government Code was amended in
1998 to permit "a court" to order electronic recording of "court"
proceedings in a "limited civil case, or a misdemeanor or infraction
case" where an official reporter is unavailable."'
Section 72194.5 of the California Government Code is an exception to
section 274c of the California Code of Civil Procedure.6' Section 274c,
the municipal court "analogue" to section 269(a) of the California Code
of Civil Procedure, requires a court reporter to record municipal court
proceedings upon the request of a party or the court.'0 The Legislature
enacted section 72194.5 to address a critical shortage of court reporters
in municipal court." The Judicial Council, as section 72194.5's sponsor,
66. CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 72194.5 (West 1997) (prior to 1998 amendment)
("Whenever an official court reporter ... is unavailable to report an action or proceeding
in a municipal ... court ... , the municipal ... court may order that the action ... be
electronically recorded ....").
67. See News Release, supra note 8.
68. Act of Sept. 28, 1998, ch. 931, sec. 324, § 72194.5, 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv.
5101, 5213 (West) (S.B. 2139); see CAL. LAW REvISION COMM'N, 28 REPoRTS,
RECOMMENDATIONS, AND STUDIES 383 (I 998) ("Section 72194.5 is amended to
accommodate unification of the municipal and superior courts in a county."); see also
CAL. Gov'TCODE § 72194.5 historical and statutory notes (West Supp. 1999). The 1998
Amendment provides:
Nothing in this act is intended to change the extent to which court reporter
services or electronic reporting may be used in the courts. It is the intent of
this act to provide for court reporter services and electronic reporting in a
county in which there is no municipal court to the same extent as otherwise
provided by law in a county in which there is a municipal court.
Ch. 931, sec. 507, 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 5308.
69. Section 274c says: "Official reporters shall, at the request of either party or of
the court in a limited civil case, ... take down in shorthand all the testimony .... " CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE§ 274c (West Supp. 1999).
70. See Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 341, 374 (Ct. App. 1995). The court wrote:
It appears to us that Government Code section 72194.5 . . . merely
authorizes ... an exception to the command in section 274c, the municipal and
justice court analogue to section 269, that an official reporter record those civil
proceedings in municipal or justice courts for which the judge or a party
requests the presence of an official reporter.
Id. (footnote omitted).
71. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 48-49 (1989). The
report states:
Under the direction of the Judicial Council, the Administrative Office of
the Courts (AOC) in 1974 conducted a study of court reporting in California
municipal courts to determine whether electronic recording could be used in
courts without certified shorthand reporters.
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made no attempt to extend authorization of electronic recording to
superior court." The court reporters did not actively oppose this bill
"because-with the exception of felony preliminary hearings-business
is sparse in municipal court.... [B]ecause few parties appeal municipal
court decisions, most parties do not order transcripts in municipal court
proceedings." 73
3.

Repeated Attempts to Update Court Reporting Statutes
Blocked by Powerful Court Reporter Lobby

When the electronic recording of court proceedings became feasible in
the early 1970s," California courts were uncertain whether the use of
At the time of the study, municipal courts did not uniformly maintain
records of all proceedings. Some courts provided a stenographic reporter for
all proceedings, others employed reporters only for felony preliminaries, and a
range of other practices existed between these two extremes.
In the absence of stenographic reporters, the majority of municipal courts
relied on the handwritten minutes of courtroom clerks to make court records.
The AOC study indicated that electronic recording could be used to make court
records or to supplement existing court record-making systems.
The study led to . . . . Government Code section 72194.5, which
authorizes electronic recording in municipal and justice courts under certain
circumstances ....
Id.; see also Koppel, Push-Comes-to-Shove, supra note 20, at 112-13.
72. See Koppel, Push-Comes-to-Shove, supra note 20, at 112-13.
73. Id. at 113 (footnote omitted). The First District Court of Appeal has held that,
where a misdemeanor defendant does appeal his conviction in municipal court, an
electronic recording of municipal court proceedings satisfies the defendant's
constitutional right to a "verbatim 'record of sufficient completeness' permitting proper
consideration of an appeal." In re Armstrong, 178 Cal. Rptr. 902,908 (Ct. App. 1981).
The Armstrong court rejected appellant's argument that electronic recording would not
provide him with an adequate verbatim record, stating: "If the claimed inadequacies of
electronic recording shall hereafter be established by judicial experience, or otherwise,
the constitutional requirement will not have been met." Id. Recently, the Second
District Court of Appeal rejected appellant's reliance on Armstrong to support his
contention that "electronic recording has now been found by judicial experience
construing statutory requirements to be inadequate in felony trials conducted in Superior
Court when an objection has been made." People v. Turner, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 745
(Ct. App. 1998). The Turner court explained, "Armstrong does not purport to decide
whether electronic recording is inferior to certified shorthand reporting." Id.
74. See J. MICHAEL GREENWOOD ET AL., A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF
STENOORAPHIC AND AUDIOTAPE METHODS FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
REPORTING 13 (1983) (describing a study in the Sacramento courts in 1973). The
California Legislature authorized the use of electronic recording in municipal courts in
1975. See supra note 71. Courts began to experiment with non-stenographic verbatim
recording technology in the early 1950s, beginning with sound recording followed by
audio-video recording in the I 980s. See, e.g., WARREN OLNEY III, REPORT ON
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this technology required express statutory authorization." Existing court
reporting statutes that originated in the 1860s, when shorthand was the
only verbatim recording technology, naturally referred only to shorthand
court reporters." Before 1975, no statute expressly authorized electronic
recording in any California state court." Since shorthand court reporting
is expressly authorized by statute, it might seem, upon superficial
analysis, that electronic recording also requires express statutory
authorization and that, without it, courts are powerless to electronically
record their proceedings.
Understandably reluctant to use its own rulemaking authority over
court administration, and, desiring the electronic recording option, the
Judicial Council chose the politically safer course of seeking express
statutory authority from the Legislature." From 1971 to the present,
ELECTRONIC SOUND RECORDING IN THE TRIAL COURTS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 2 (1961)
("Even prior to . . . 1958, there had been some studies and experiments with electronic
recording of court proceedings carried on at the instigation of the Judicial
Conference .... ").
75. Such authorization is not required, and California's tradition of detailed
legislative regulation of court administration and procedure is baggage from the Field
Code days when court procedure was micro-managed by state legislatures. See Koppel,
Push-Comes-to-Shove, supra note 20, at 149-51; see also supra notes 59-65 and
accompanying text. California's legislative dominance of court administration and
procedure is out-of-step with national trends and is at odds with the reformist spirit of
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution that expressly confers upon the
Judicial Council rulemaking power over "court administration." CAL. CONST., art. VI, §
6; see Glenn S. Koppel, Populism, Politics, and Procedure: The Saga of Summary
Judgment and the Rulemaking Process in California, 24 l'EPP. L. Rev. 455, 461 (1997)
("California is one of the few remaining American jurisdictions where the legislature
continues to write the rules of court procedure."); Koppel, Push-Comes-to-Shove, supra
note 20, at 128-31, 149-55.
76. These statutes have been updated occasionally to reflect technological
advancements in shorthand. For example, in 1903, section 269 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure was amended to permit official reporters to write out their shorthand
notes "by typewriter, or other printing machine" in addition to "plain and legible
longhand." Act of Mar. 19, 1903, ch. 200, sec. I, § 269, 1903 Cal. Stat. 234, 234. This
same section was again amended in 1993 to authorize delivery of a transcript "in a
computer-readable form." Act of Oct. 9, 1993, ch. 1016, sec. I,§ 269(c), 1993 Cal. Stat.
5737, 5738 (A.B. 1929).
77. In 1975, section 72194.5 of the California Code of Government was enacted,
permitting municipal courts to electronically record proceedings when an official
reporter is unavailable. See CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 72194.5 historical and statutory notes
(West Supp. 1999).
78. The reasons for this prudent approach are twofold. Politically, the Council had
good reason to defer to the Legislature as a matter of comity. Although the courts and
the Legislature exercise concurrent authority over court administration in California, the
Legislature still plays the dominant role of senior partner in court administration and
rulemaking. See supra note 33. And, like all legislatures, the California Legislature
holds the power of the purse with the concomitant ability to cut court funding in
retaliation against the judiciary for perceived slights. See, e.g., Bill Ainsworth, Battle of
the Branches-The Supreme Court vs. the Legislature, CAL. J., Jan. I, 1993, at 21-23.
The LEXIS version of this article offered as the article's "highlight" the words, "The
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numerous bills have been introduced in the Legislature that would have
expressly authorized electronic recording of proceedings in superior
courts and administrative hearings throughout the state." The court
Supreme Court upheld legislative term limits, so the Legislature slashed the Court's
budget." Id., available in LEXIS. California's judiciary is acutely cognizant of the
populist political culture of this state, inherited from its frontier past, in which courts
must not appear to usurp the democratic prerogatives of the Legislature by making
politically sensitive decisions that may offend powerful interest groups like the court
reporters. See Koppel, Push-Comes-to-Shove, supra note 20, at 149-51. Legally, the
limits of the Judicial Council's rulemaking power are ill-defined. Under article VI,
section 6 of the state constitution, the Council's rules of court may not be "inconsistent
with statute." CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6. This, of course, is an ambiguous phrase. Given
the ambiguity of the constitutional limits on the court's rulemaking authority and of outof-date court reporting statutes, the Council may have preferred to avoid, if possible, the
risk of unnecessarily promulgating rules that could be struck down by the courts-a risk
that became reality in the CCRA decisions.
79. See generally Dresslar, supra note 34, at I. Dresslar wrote:
Occasionally, bills establishing or modifying electronic recording pilot projects
have slipped through the Legislature and become law. But the more farreaching proposals---even those that protected the jobs of current reportershave gone down to ignominious defeat.
Some examples:
•
AB626, carried by then-Assemblyman William Filante in the 198182 session, would have allowed electronic recording upon the
stipulation of both parties. It died at its first committee hearing.
•
AB586, carried by Assemblyman Robert Frazee in the 1983-84
session, would have allowed electronic recording in judicial
proceedings. It didn't even get a hearing.
•
AB1523, carried by then-Assemblyman, now-Sen. Tim Leslie in the
1987-88 session, would have established a pilot project for use of
video recording of judicial proceedings. It never reached the
Assembly floor.
•
AB3112, carried by Assemblyman Curt Pringle in the 1989-90
session, would have allowed [administrative hearings conducted by
the Office of Administrative Hearings to be reported electronically at
the option of the administrative law judge without the parties' prior
consent]. Pringle dropped it without even taking it to a hearing.
•
AB2937, carried by Isenberg in the 1991-92 session, would have
allowed electronic recording of judicial proceedings. Isenberg was
the only "yes" vote in his own committee. Not only did Isenberg get
hammered, but the Judicial Council got embarrassed. It supported
the measure, but reporters persuaded individual judges to write
letters to committee members opposing it.
•
SB211, introduced by Sen. Milton Marks [in 1993], would allow
Marin County courts to use electronic recording in all judicial
proceedings except death penalty cases. It is languishing in the
Senate Rules Committee, where it probably will die without a policy
committee hearing.
•
Sometimes the association kills ideas even before they get into bills.
Another proposal by Isenberg--{;arried [in 1993] on behalf of the
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reporter lobby blocked each of these bills.'° The Council's repeated
defeat in the Legislature laid the groundwork for its defeat in the First
Sacramento Superior and Municipal Courts-provides a prime
example.
Id. at I. This Article's research adds to the defeated list as follows:
•
A.B. 506, 1971 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1971) (introduced by Assemblymen
Warren (Chair-Assembly Committee on the Judiciary), Moretti, Cullen,
and Thomas on Feb 15, 1971, would have authorized the electronic
recording of proceedings in all courts in lieu of a court reporter; died in
committee on Jan. 3, 1972).
•
A.B. 3395, 1973-1974 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1974) (introduced by
Assemblyman Lanterman on Mar. 14, 1974, would have authorized the
electronic recording of proceedings in all courts in lieu of a court reporter;
died in committee on Nov. 30, 1974).
•
S.B. 851, 1978-1979 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1979) (introduced by
Assemblyman Philip Wyman on Mar. 12, 1979, would have permitted
state agencies to reduce costs by permitting them to record administrative
hearings through multi-track audio recording devices in lieu of shorthand
reporters).
•
S.B. 703, 1978-1979 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1979) (introduced by Senator
Sieroty on Mar. 22, 1979, would have replaced section 72194.5 of the
California Government Code with a blanket authorization to municipal
and superior courts to use electronic recording irrespective of the
availability of an official reporter and would have authorized electronic
recording of administrative hearings).
•
S.B. 1050, 1978-1979 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1979) (introduced by Senator
Holmdahl on April 2. 1979, would have amended section 269 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure to require official reporters in superior
courts to take down testimony "in shorthand, or by electronic recording
device at the judge's discretion").
•
A.B. 2034, 1982-1983 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1983) (introduced by
Assemblyman Bradley on Mar. 7, 1983, would have authorized electronic
recording of administrative hearings upon consent of all the parties).
•
A.B. 2113, 1995-1996 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (introduced by
Assembly Member Miller on Jan. 30, 1996, would have expressly
authorized the Judicial Council to promulgate rules of court providing
unqualified authorization to superior courts to produce a verbatim record
of proceedings).
•
A.B. 128, 1997-1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998) (introduced by
Assembly Member Bill Morrow on April 20, 1998, would have expressly
authorized the Judicial Council to promulgate rules of court providing
unqualified authorization to any court to produce a verbatim record of
proceedings; bill died in committee on April 20, 1998).
•
A.B. 1023, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (introduced by
Assembly Member Margett on Feb. 25, 1999 to expressly authorize the
Judicial Council to promulgate rules of court providing unqualified
authorization to any court to produce a verbatim record of proceedings;
last committee action: "Hearing canceled at the request of author" on
April 20, 1999).
•
A.B. 1354, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (introduced by
Assembly Member Lampert on Feb. 26, 1999 to "state the intent of the
Legislature to enact provisions permitting the use of electronic recording
of court proceedings in participating counties").
80. See Greacen, supra note 32; Jacobs, supra note 12, at BI; Dresslar, supra note
34, at I; Walters, supra note 21, at 6.
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District Court of Appeal in the CCRA I decision. Although the CCRA
court disclaimed any formal reliance on the failure of the Legislature to
enact express authorization for electronic recording, the court interpreted
the Judicial Council's strategic choice to seek express legislative
authorization as an implied admission by the Council that it lacked
rulemaking authority to expressly authorize electronic recording.' 1
In 1986, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 825--codified as
section 270 of the California Code of Civil Procedure-that required the
Judicial Council to "establish a demonstration project to assess the costs,
benefits, and acceptability of utilizing audio and video recording as a
means of producing a verbatim record of proceedings" in a limited
number of superior court departments." Assembly Bill 825 contained a
built-in "sunset" provision. The project self-destructed on January 1,
199483 and was not renewed in spite of the following recommendation
of the legislatively-appointed Electronic Recording Advisory
Committee: "In civil litigation, it should be the litigant's decision which
method (ER or CSR) will be used to make the record."84
Assembly Bill 825 was the product of a political compromise between
the Judicial Council and the CCRA. 85 As originally introduced,
Assembly Bill 825 would have provided blanket and temporally
8 I. See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
82. Act of July 16, 1986, ch. 373, sec. 1, § 270(a), 1986 Cal. Stat. 1552, 1552
(A.B. 825).
83. See id. (terminating on Jan. I, 1992); Act of Sept. 22, 1989, ch. 678, sec. I, 2,
§§ 270(a), 72194.5, 1989 Cal. Stat. 2134, 2135, 2136 (A.B. 1854) (extending the life of
the demonstration project another two years and expanding the number of superior court
departments authorized to participate in the project).
84. ELECTRONIC RECORDING PROJECT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 25, at 7.
The court reporters insisted upon the formation of the legislative advisory committee as
part of the price for lifting their opposition to the demonstration project bill, Assembly
Bill 825. See SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, supra note 25, at 5. According to the
Senate Committee on Judiciary, "[The court reporters] questioned the objectivity of the
Judicial Council in reviewing the use of electronic recording, as the Council sponsored
the bill in the first place. This dual review ... is a compromise meant to ensure that all
parties involved have input into the Legislature's evaluation." Id.
85. See SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, supra note 25, at 5. This report states:
Last year this measure arrived before this Committee in a significantly
different form, establishing a pilot project in Los Angeles County and
providing a blanket authorization for electronic recording devices in rural
counties. Proponents and opponents agreed to undertake negotiations in order
to determine if a compromise could be found. After months of work, they
successfully developed the current language and are now in delicate
agreement.
Id. at 4.
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unlimited authorization to electronically record proceedings in all
superior courts. Through intense opposition and lobbying, the CCRA
succeeded in limiting the scope and duration of electronic recording in
superior court and, ultimately, killed it.'•
As a result of the demonstration project, "about 15% of superior
courtrooms [were] equipped for video and audio recording" as of May
15, 1996." In 1987, "demonstration" courtrooms in Los Angeles Coun7.
Superior Court were equipped with sound recording technology.'
Between 1990 and 1992, demonstration courtrooms in ten additional
counties were established." Of these ten additional counties, five
implemented audio recording 90 and five-including Orange Countyinstalled video recording technology.' 1
The doomed fate of electronic recording in superior court under the
demonstration project was a foregone conclusion. Anticipating the
January 1, 1994 "sunset" of the demonstration project, the Judicial
Council sponsored Assembly Bill 2937, introduced on February 19,
1992 by Assembly Judiciary Committee Chair Phil Isenberg." This bill
would have given any court, including superior courts, the discretion to
"utilize audio or video recording as the means of making a verbatim
record of any hearing or proceedings."" Notwithstanding California's
seventeen-year experience with electronic recording in municipal
courts94 and six-year experience in selected superior courts under the
demonstration project," as well as a favorable evaluation of the
demonstration project in the Judicial Council's report to the
Legislature,'• the bill died in committee on its first hearing. The
86. For an expanded account of the politics behind the demonstration project, see
Koppel, Push-Comes-to-Shove, supra note 20, at 113-17.
87. Birdlebough, supra note 11, at 2.
88. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., REP. TO THE CAL. LEGIS. ON ELECTRONIC
RECORDING DEMONSTRATION PROJECT I, 2, 6 ( 1992). Subsequently, Los Angeles
County Superior Court installed video recording in 3 departments in addition to the 32
other departments that were wired for sound. See id.
89. See id. at 6. Counties set up for demonstration courtrooms were Alameda,
Contra Costa, Orange, Riverside, Sacramento, San Bernardino, San Diego, San Mateo,
Santa Cruz, and Solano Counties. See id.
90. See id.
Counties then implementing audio recording were Alameda,
Sacramento, San Diego, Santa Cruz, and Solano Counties. See id.
91. See id. at 4-6.
92. A.B. 2937, 1991-1992 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1992).
93. Id.
94. Section 72194.5 of the California Government Code was enacted in 1975.
Seventeen years later, Assembly Bill 2937 was introduced.
95. The first demonstration project began in Los Angeles in 1986. See supra note
87. Six years later, Assembly Bill 2937 was introduced.
96. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 88, at 36-37. This report states:
The use of electronic recording as an alternative method to produce and
preserve the verbatim court record has been successfully demonstrated in the
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committee chair, Phil Isenberg, cast the only "aye" vote."
Since the defeat of the Isenberg bill, five other electronic recording
bills have been introduced into the Legislature. Senate Bill 211 died in
committee." Assembly Bill 2113 was defeated on the Assembly floor
by forty-one percent of the total Assembly's membership." Assembly
Bill 128 also died in committee.")() Assembly Bills 1023 and 1354,
introduced in early 1999, both dropped off the legislative radar screen at
101
the time of this Article's publication.
But, despite the apparent clout
of the CCRA, the Legislature has stopped short of slamming the door
shut on electronic recording. Indeed, the Legislature has never enacted a
statute that expressly requires the use of shorthand to make a verbatim
record, nor has it enacted a statute that expressly precludes the use of
electronic recording technology to make a verbatim record.

current pilot project. ...
Electronic recording has been accepted by the bar and judges as they have
been exposed to it and become more comfortable with it. ... This project
confirms what has been found by the many state and federal courts who have
used electronic recording for years. The issue is one of making a verbatim
record, and electronic recording has proved to be as acceptable in making a
record as that made by a stenographic reporter.
Id. (emphasis added).
97. See Dresslar, supra note 34, at I.
98. See Complete Bill History, S.B. 211, 1993-1994 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1993),
available at California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information (visited Jan. 27, 2000)
<http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/93-94/bill/sen/sb_0201-0250/sb_21 l_bill_history.
html>.
99. See Vote Information, A.B. 2113, 1995-1996 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996),
available at California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information (visited Jan. 8, 2000) <http:
//www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bill/ab_2101-2150/ab_2113_vote_960523_0134PM_as
m_floor.html>.
100. An inquiry regarding this bill shows that the last historical action occurred on
April 20, I 998, when the bill was re-referred to the Committee on Public Safety. See
Current Bill Status, A.B. 128, 1997-1998 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998), available at
California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information (visited Jan. 8, 2000)
<http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/97 -98/bill/asm/ab_O IO 1-0150/ab_I 28_bill_status.html>.
IOI. An inquiry regarding the current bill status of Assembly Bill 1023 reveals that
a hearing on the bill was canceled at the request of its author in April of 1999. See
Current Bill Status, A.B. 1023, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999), available at
California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information (visited Jan. 8, 2000)
<http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_lOOl-1050/ab_l023_bill_19990421_status.
html>. Likewise, there has been no action on Assembly Bill 1354 since March I, 1999.
See Complete Bill History, A.B. 1354, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999), available
at California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information (visited Jan. 8, 2000)
<http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_1351-1400/ab _ l 354_bill_ 1999030 I _his tor
y. html>.
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C.

1.

The Cases

The View from the Fifth Appellate District: The
LACRAA Decision (January 1995)

During the final years of the demonstration project, the superior courts
of Los Angeles, Sacramento, and Orange Counties expanded electronic
recording into non-demonstration courtrooms-Le., into a number of
superior court departments that exceeded the number prescribed by
section 270 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 102 In nondemonstration courtrooms equipped with electronic recording devices,
the practice of the Los Angeles Superior Court was to provide litigants
with an official reporter "on request." 103 If neither party requested an
official reporter, the court could electronically record the proceedingsand could do so without obtaining any explicit agreement of the
parties. 104
Official reporters were unavailable in demonstration
10
courtrooms, as authorized by statute. ' Alleging that "the use of
electronic recording in lieu of official court reporters violated numerous
statutory provisions," 106 the Los Angeles County Court Reporters
Association (the LACRAA) brought suit (the LACRAA suit) against the
10
Los Angeles Superior Court on February 2, 1993. ' LACRAA sought to
enjoin the use of electronic recording to make a record of proceedings in
non-demonstration courtrooms-even where the parties did not request
an official reporter under section 269(a) of the California Code of Civil
108
Procedure.
To avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest, the LACRAA suit was
transferred to Kem County. 109 Ultimately, superior court Judge Anspach
agreed with the court reporters that section 269 "does not provide for the
102. See Jean Guccione, Suing for Security: Reporters Take to the Courts to
Prevent Spread of Electronic Recording, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 3, 1993, at 5; Nancy
Morse, The Reporter Never Rests: Videotaping Program Expands; Not Everyone Happy,
L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 18, 1993, at I.
103. Lauren Blau, Court Reporters Win a Round in Taping Conflict, L.A. DAILY J.,
Sept. 3, 1993, at I.
104. See Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 341, 343-44 (Ct. App. 1995).
105. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 270(b) (West Supp. 1999) ("In courtrooms
operating under the [now-expired] demonstration project, audio or video recording may
be used in lieu of the verbatim record prepared by a court reporter .... "); see also Blau,
supra note 103, at I ("But court reporters are provided on request in courtrooms staffed
with electronic recording equipment, except for the 35 in the pilot project.").
106. Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 343.
107. See id. at 342.
108. See id. at 343.
109. See id.
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use of electronic recording in lieu of a court reporter" 110 and that,
"[a]bsent legislative authority, only an official reporter can transcribe
Superior Court proceedings." 111 However, Judge Anspach also ruled that
the statutes do not preclude the parties from expressly waiving "the
required use of a court reporter" 112 by "stipulat[ing] to the use of
electronic recording." 113 Adopting a compromise position that pleased
neither the LACRAA nor the Los Angeles Superior Court, the court
ordered the Los Angeles Superior Court to
cease and desist from using electronic recording as a means of recordation of
judicial proceedings in the Superior Courts of Los Angeles County for
proceedings in excess of the number of judicial departments for Los Angeles
County authorized to use electronic recording ... except where the parties and
the court do not request a court reporter and the parties agree with the
approval of the court to the use of electronic reporting. 114
11

Both parties appealed. ' The LACRAA pressed for an absolute ban
on electronic recording in superior court under any circumstances, even
if the parties expressly stipulate to the use of electronic recording in a
given proceeding. 116 The Los Angeles Superior Court argued for
eliminating Judge Anspach's requirement of an express stipulation by
· 117
th e parties.
During the pendency of the IACRAA appeal, the sun had already set
on the demonstration project (on January 1, 1994). 118 The Isenberg bill
had been defeated almost two years earlier (on April 1, 1992) in
committee. 119 On November 30, 1993, one month before the expiration
of the demonstration project, and while the IACRAA appeal was
pendinf, the Judicial Council promulgated the Electronic Recording
Rules 12 -which the First Appellate District subsequently held to be

Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
113. Id.
I 14. Id. (emphasis added).
I I 5. See id. ("The court has appealed and the association has cross-appealed.").
116. See id. at 344.
117. See id.
118. See supra note 83.
119. See Complete Bill History, A.B. 2937, 1991-1992 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1992),
available at California Legislative Counsel, Bill Information (visited Jan. 27, 2000)
<http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bill/asm/ab_2901-2950/ab_2937 _bill_history.
html>; see also supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
120. See ELECTRONIC RECORDING RULES, supra note 3.
110.
111.
112.
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invalid in CCRA I. 121 The Electronic Recording Rules, effective January
1, 1994, authorized all superior courts to use electronic recording to
make the verbatim record under either of two circumstances: (1) when
an official reporter is "unavailable," 122 or (2) when the r,arties proceed in
the absence of an official reporter "without objection." " The Council's
rules would have permitted a superior court to electronically record
proceedings over the objection of a party who requested a court reporter
if the court found that an official reporter was unavailable. 124 The
Electronic Recording Rules, therefore, gave the superior courts greater
discretion to use electronic recording than that discretion afforded under
the Los Angeles Superior Court system (challenged in the LACRAA
suit), which required the court to provide an official reporter to any
party who requested one.
The California Court Reporters Association promptly brought suit
against the Judicial Council in December, 1993, seeking to invalidate the
Electronic Recording Rules as "inconsistent with statute"m and,
therefore, an unconstitutional exercise of the Judicial Council's
rulemaking authority. 126 The Fifth District Court of Appeal decided the
LACRAA appeal in January of 1995, nine months before CCRA I
invalidated the Judicial Council's Electronic Recording Rules.
Reversing Judge Anspach, the court sustained the electronic recording
121. See CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 46 (Ct. App. 1995).
122. CAL. R. CT. 980.3 (1996) (repealed 1997) (emphasis added). Rule 980.3
defined ''unavailable" as follows:
An official reporter or official reporter pro tempore is unavailable within the
meaning of this rule, among other circumstances: (I) when the person
regularly employed or under contract as such fails to appear because of illness
or injury, the need to transcribe notes of cases on appeal, or other cause beyond
the court's control; or (2) when the court determines that the funds available
for reporting services are insufficient to employ a qualified person for the
position at the prevailing wage or at the normal per diem rate of compensation;
or (3) when the court detennines that a reporter will be unavailable based on
the court's existing staff of official court reporters, reasonable projections
concerning official reporters' vacations, sick leaves, and other approved
absences, and reasonable projections as to the workload in each of the court's
departments.
CAL. R. CT. 980.3(b) (1996) (repealed 1997), quoted in CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 48
n.12.
123. CAL. R. CT. 980.3 (1996) (repealed 1997), quoted in CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 48 n.12.
124. See id.
125. The phrase "inconsistent with statute" comes from article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
126. See CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 46-47. The California Court Reporters
Association joined as additional defendants Patrick O'Connell, Alameda County
Auditor-Controller, and Ron Overholt, Executive Officer/Clerk of the Alameda County
Superior Court, but failed to join the court administrators of the other county superior
courts around the state. See id. at 46 n.2.
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practice of the Los Angeles Superior Court, stating:
We therefore anive at a very narrow holding: the court is not prohibited, by
any explicit or implicit legislative command contained in those specific statutes
cited by the association, from choosing to maintain a record of general civil
proceedings by means of electronic recording devices where neither the court
nor any party requests that a verbatim record be taken by an official shorthand
reporter pursuant to the provisions of section 269. 127

The LACRAA court expressly declined to decide "the purposes, if any,
for which the generated electronic recording may be used, because this
question is outside the scope of the discrete issue presented by the
association's petition and evidence." 12' The court was apparently
referring to the admissibility of a tape recording of proceedings, or a
transcript derived therefrom, as evidence in the apgellate record offered
"to prove what took place during the proceeding."' The LACRAA court
127. Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d
341, 349-50 (Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added). In this case, the court addressed the
significance of several statutes. The court wrote, ''The effect of section 270 was simply
to override section 269 insofar as the demonstration courtrooms were concerned." Id. at
345. The court stated "[s]ection 273 does nothing more than create an evidentiary
presumption [of accuracy for an official reporter's transcript]." Id. at 346. The court
referred to section 274c as "the municipal and justice court analogue to section 269." Id.
at 347. The court also said: "It appears to us that Government Code section 72194.5 is in
the same class as former section 270, and merely authorizes ... an exception to the
command in section 274c .... " Id. Finally, referring to sections 68086(a), 68086(b),
69941, 69942, 69952, and 69953 of the California Code of Government and to various
sections of the California Code of Business and Professions beginning with section 8015,
the court stated:
None of the other statutes cited by the association are of consequence....
These statutes are perfectly compatible with section 269. They all either relate
to the office of official reporter for purposes of section 269 or apply when a
request is made in a civil case for the services of an official reporter within the
scope of section 269. If no such request is made, these statutes, like section
269, are inapplicable.
Id. at 347-48.
128. Id. at 350.
129. Id. at 344. The court wrote:
The decision by the parties not to insist upon the presence of an official
reporter may have certain consequences if it later becomes necessary to prove
what took place during the proceeding, such as when the unsuccessful party
wishes to appeal or move for a new trial, but these are concerns which the
parties should consider when deciding whether to take advantage of section
269.
Id. (footnotes omitted). In an unpublished 1998 opinion, the fourth appellate district,
division three, whose jurisdiction includes Orange County, rejected an appellant's
"paradoxical" argument that electronic recordings cannot be used in "the creation of
official reporter's transcripts for the purposes of appeal." Gandall v. Grimes, No.
6017121, slip op. at 3 (Cal. App. Ct. Aug. 26, 1998). In Grimes, a certified transcript
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also expressly declined to rule on the validity of the Judicial Council's
Electronic Recording Rules. " 0
2.

The View from the First Appellate District: CCRA I
(October 1995) and CCRA II (December 1997)

a.

CCRAI

On October 17, 1995, nine months after the LACRAA decision, the
First District Court of Appeal delivered its opinion in CCRA /.rn The
CCRA court interpreted substantially the same statutes that were
reviewed by the LACRAA court' 32-the same statutes found by the
LACRAA court not to prohibit, expressly or implicitly, the electronic
recording practice of the Los Angeles superior court."' The CCRA 1
court, however, interpreting these statutes broadly, determined that the
Judicial Council's Electronic Recording Rules were "inconsistent with
statute." 134
The fact that the Legislature has by statute authorized electronic recording
in some contexts suggests strongly that-unless the existing statutory scheme
providing for the official record to be taken down in shorthand is amended-the
Legislature does not intend that electronic recording of superior court
proceedings be the method of creating an official record. Although the statutes
do not expressly prohibit electronic recording of superior court proceedings,
was prepared from tape by "a duly designated court transcriber." Id. at 5 (emphasis
added); see infra notes 167-77 and accompanying text.
130. See Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350. After
the filing of the parties' reply briefs, the CCRA filed an amicus curiae brief that made
the following arguments not raised by the Los Angeles County Court Reporters
Association:
(I) [R Jule 980.3 is invalid because it is "inconsistent with the comprehensive
statutory scheme that provides for the making of the superior court record;" (2)
the court improperly expended public funds to install, maintain and operate the
electronic recording devices in the various courtrooms ... (4) the court
improperly made it a practice to offer to sell copies of the electronic tapes to
the parties involved in the civil proceedings for use in connection with motions
for new trial and appeal.
Id. Noting the "limited case made by the [Los Angeles Court Reporters A]ssociation,"
the court declined the CCRA's "invitation" to the court "to address all these arguments
in the interests of efficiency and finality, in order to resolve the entire controversy
between the parties." Id.
13 I. 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44 (Ct. App. 1995).
132. See id. at 51-55. These statutes were sections 269(a), 270, 273, and 274c of
the California Code of Civil Procedure and sections 68086(a) and (b), 69941, 69948,
69952(b ). 70044.5-70064, and 72194.5 of the California Code of Government. See id.
133. See Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 343-51.
For example, the court wrote, "We fail to see in section 273 an expression, explicit or
implicit, of a legislative intent to forbid all means of making a verbatim record of civil
proceedings in superior courts except by the use of official shorthand reporters." Id. at
346.
134. CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 56.
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they nevertheless lead to one conclusion-that the Legislature intended that
such proceedings be stenographically recorded by official shorthand
reporters. 135

In CCRA I, the court's statutory analysis began with section 269(a) of
the California Code of Civil Procedure,1 36 which requires the official
reporter to prepare a verbatim record "at the request of either party, or of
the court," 137 rather than with section 69941 of the California
Government Code, which authorizes superior court judges to appoint
official reporters."' The court considered section 269 as the keystone of
139
the "statutory scheme of making an official record" and, therefore,
140
began its statutory survey with this code section.
The pivot of the
court's reasoning is the incorrect premise that statutory law lays down a
general requirement that something called the "official record" be taken
141
down exclusively by official reporters. According to the court, the fact
135. Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
136. See id. at 5 I.
137. Id. (quoting CAL. C!v. PROC. CODE § 269(a) (West Supp. 1994) (current
version available at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 269(a) (West Supp. 1999))).
138. See CAL. Gov'TCODE § 69941 (West 1997).
139. CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 5 I. The court did acknowledge that the LACRAA
court "held that section 269 does not require that the official reporter make the record of
superior court proceedings, unless requested by a party or the judge." Id. at 52.
However, the court did not squarely address the inconsistency between the LA CRAA
court's narrow view of section 269 and the court's broad view that places the emphasis
on the mandatory aspects of section 269. The CCRA I opinion merely stated, "This
conclusion is consistent with the opinion of the Legislative Counsel holding that section
269 requires that superior court proceedings be taken down by an official shorthand
reporter if a request is made." Id.
140. See id. at 51 ("Several statutes comprise the statutory scheme of making an
official record. Subdivision (a) of section 269 sets out the basic provisions for
requesting an official superior court record."). Based upon the original 1861 statute from
which these two code sections derive, statutory analysis should begin with section 69941
of the California Code of Government. All other code sections relied upon by the court
are applicable only if the superior court decides, in its discretion, to appoint an official
reporter. This view is consistent with Judge Staniforth' s trial court opinion that the first
appellate district court reversed in CCRA I. See id. at 47.
141. The court referred to an "existing statutory scheme providing for the official
record to be taken down in shorthand," and to a legislative intent that "[superior court]
proceedings be stenographically recorded by official shorthand reporters." Id. at 55.
The flaw in the court's reasoning is that none of the statutes relied upon by the court to
support its inference of a "statutory scheme providing for the official record to be taken
down in shorthand" refers to an "official record." Rather, the statutes refer to an
"official reporter." See, e.g., CAL. C!v. PROC. CODE § 273 (West Supp. 1999) ("The
report of the official reporter ... of any court, ... when transcribed and certified as being
a correct transcript of the testimony and proceedings in the case, is prima facie evidence
of such testimony and proceedings."). There is no general statutory requirement that
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that the Legislature has enacted statutory exceptions to this general
requirement-authorizing electronic recording in "certain" limited
circumstances 142-indicates a legislative intent to preempt the Judicial
Council and the courts from usinr. electronic recording unless expressly
43
authorized by the Legislature.
The CCRA court discerned a
"legislative pattern [that] suggests that while electronic recording is
sometimes proper, the normal practice is that a shorthand reporter is to
create the official record unless statutory law provides otherwise. " 144
The CCRA I decision involved questionable reasoning in at least three
respects. First, the court drew upon inapposite administrative agency
case law that considers legislative rejection of an agency proposal
identical to the challenged agency regulation as "persuasive" evidence
14
that the regulation is not "consistent with controlling legislation. " '
Thus, the court concluded, "In our case, the Judicial Council's attempt to
obtain legislative amendment of the existing statutory scheme suggests
that its present interpretation of that scheme as consistent with the rules
146
it promulgated after rejection of the amendments is shaky, at best."
Second, the court determined that the Judicial Council's unsuccessful
legislative efforts to secure the enactment of express blanket
authorization amounts to an implied admission by conduct "that
legislative authorization is needed before electronic recording of
superior court proceedings may be made." 141 The court reached this
courts maintain any verbatim record, official or otherwise. Section 269(a) of the
California Code of Civil Procedure leaves that decision in the hands of the parties and
the judge, along with the decision whether to employ the services of an official reporter
to make the verbatim record. See CAL. C1v. PROC. CODE§ 269(a).
142. CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54.
143. See id. For an expanded critique of the court's reasoning, see Koppel, PushComes-to-Shove, supra note 20, at 170-85.
144. CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 56.
146. Id. (emphasis added). The court's reasoning is flawed for two reasons. First,
the Judicial Council is not an administrative agency created by the Legislature whose
rules of court must be "consistent with controlling legislation." The Council is a
constitutionally-constituted administrative agency of the California judiciary vested with
the power to promulgate rules of "court administration, practice and procedure, not
inconsistent with statute." CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (emphasis added). Second, the
challenged rules of court were more limited in scope than the rejected amendments
mentioned by the court. CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 56. Whereas the authorization
conferred on superior courts by the Council's Electronic Recording Rules was limited to
two circumstances (where neither party objected or where an official reporter was
"unavailable"), the authorization contained in the Isenberg bill (A.B. 2937) was not so
limited. See Koppel, Push-Comes-to-Shove, supra note 20, at 173.
147. CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 56. The court's reasoning fails to consider that the
Council and the Legislature exercise concurrent rulemaking power over court
administration. In the absence of clear statutory indication that electronic recording of
proceedings is forbidden in superior court, the Judicial Council has the powerconcurrent with the Legislature-to promulgate rules that provide the courts with
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dubious conclusion despite its concession that, "[a]s evidence of
legislative intent, unadopted proposals have been held to have little
14
value." ' Third, although the court acknowledged "the difficulties of
determining the meaning of legislative rejection of proposed
amendments to existing statute," it nevertheless relied upon such
"legislative rejection" to reinforce its "interpretation of the existing
statutory scheme." 14'
b.

CCRAII

Upon remand from CCRA /, Judge Garcia of the superior court in
Alameda County enjoined the use of any gublic funds for any
"nonstenographic method"''° of court recording. 1 1 The Judicial Council
appealed Judge Garcia's judgment, contending that the injunction
exceeded the scope of CCRA I, which invalidated the Electronic
Recording Rules but did not prohibit electronic recording under any
circumstances."' The court in CCRA I/ affirmed Judge Garcia's
express authorization to use electronic recording. See Koppel, Push-Comes-to-Shove,
supra note 20, at 142-45, 164-65. The existence of legal authority in the Council to act
on its own does not mean that the Council should exercise that power unnecessarily. The
delicate political relationship between the courts and the Legislature, upon which courts
are dependent for funding, may counsel a diplomatic deference to the Legislature in the
spirit of comity. See supra note 78.
148. CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 55.
149. Id. at 56 ("However, we cannot ignore the fact that the Legislature's rejection
of the Judicial Council's proposed amendments js in accord with our interpretation of the
existing statutory scheme."). To the extent that the court's reasoning relies on legislative
rejection of electronic recording statutes, that reasoning is flawed because it ignores the
legislative dysfunction that enables a single-minded interest group to use its inordinate
lobbying power to trump the public interest. Public Choice scholarship challenges the
myth that competition among interest groups in the Legislature produces public interest
legislation. See Koppel, Push-Comes-to-Shove, supra note 20, at 138-40.
150. CCRA II, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529,531 (Ct. App. 1997).
151. See id. at 530-31.
152. See id. at 531. In CCRA I, plaintiff CCRA accomplished service of process
upon only three parties as defendants: the Judicial Council and two administrative
officers. Upon remand (after the CCRA I decision in favor of CCRA) to Judge Garcia
for entry of judgment, plaintiff CCRA moved to join as additional defendants the other
county superior courts in order that these courts would be directly bound by Judge
Garcia's judgment. See Notice of Motion to Vacate Judgment and for Leave to File
Amended Petition, CCRA I (No. 728173-6). Although Judge Garcia denied the CCRA's
motion, see Order Denying Petitioners' Motion to Amend, CCRA I (No. 728173-6), his
ultimate judgment enjoined the Judicial Council "from authorizing and from causing the
expenditure of public funds for the maintenance of or creation of a nonstenographic
method and system for preparing the official verbatim record of superior court
proceedings," thereby resolving the entire case as pied in the original petition.
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sweeping injunction and broadly construed its own holding in CCRA I,
stating, "The holding of CCRA I is a simple one: the Legislature has not
authorized the creation of an official superior court record by electronic
means under any circumstances."'" The court then concluded with a
sharply worded rebuke to the Judicial Council for arguing a narrow
interpretation of the CCRA I holding, writing:
Given this clear ruling, we are at a loss to determine why the Judicial Council
continues to dispute the obvious implications of it-that it has no justification to
permit electronic recording as a method of creating the official record of
superior court proceedings, no authority to promulgate rules authorizing such
recording and no power to spend taxpayers' funds to do that which has been
held to be inconsistent with the Legislature's intent. 154

3.

The View from the Second Appellate District:
People v. Turner (November 1998)

In People v. Turner,"' a criminal defendant argued on appeal that the
preparation of a verbatim record of his superior court trial through
electronic recording technology, rather than by a certified shorthand
reporter, violated his rights 156 under the Equal Protection Clause'" and
the Due Process Clause'" of the United States Constitution, and under
section 269(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure.'" In this case,
the second appellate district found "no error in the [trial court's] use of
the electronic recording device.""'' Addressing the appellant's statutory
argument, the court saw "no need to independently analyze the
correctness of the result reached in [CCRA 1]" 161 because the court found
that Turner had expressly waived at trial whatever statutory right he had
"to have the proceedings recorded and prepared by a certified shorthand

Judgment, CCRA I (No. 728173-6) (stating decision of Hon. David A. Garcia, Judge of
the Alameda County Superior Court, dated Nov. I, 1996). On appeal, the Judicial
Council argued that this judgment-restraining the expenditure of public funds by
superior courts to finance any use of electronic recording-exceeded the holding in
CCRA I, which holding merely invalidated the challenged Electronic Recording Rules.
See Opening Brief of Appellant at 13, CCRA II (No. 728173-6). In support, the Judicial
Council pointed out that "the Court's Opinion [in CCRA /] expressed no disagreement
with the holding of the Court of Appeal in the LACRAA case." Id.
153. CCRA II, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 531.
154. Id.
155. 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740 (Ct. App. 1998).
156. See id. at 743.
157. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1.
158. Id.
159. CAL. C!v. PROC. CODE§ 269(a) (West Supp. 1994) (amended 1998).
160. Turner, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 745.
161. Id. at 744.
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reporter. " 162
The Turner decision is significant for two reasons. First, the court
held that whatever right a party has to a certified shorthand reporter
under CCRA J's interpretation of section 269(a) can be expressly waived
by that party, thereby enabling the superior court to legally record tbe
proceedings electronically. 1• 3 Because appellant Turner had expressly
waived his statutory rights under section 269, there was no need for the
court to consider the question, addressed in the LACRAA decision,
whether a party's failure to request an official reporter would similarly
permit a superior court to make an electronic record. 164 Second, the
Turner decision is important for the words it chose to describe the CCRA
/ opinion, clearly calling into question tbe "correctness of the result" in
165
CCRA /. The court wrote:
In reaching this decision [in CCRA /], the court and the California Court
Reporters Association each conceded "that there is no statute expressly
prohibiting a superior court from making an official record by electronic means,
rather than by using certified shorthand reporters or expressly mandating that
the official superior court record be made by shorthand reporters." [The] result
[in CCRA /] was based on a statutory interpretation by the court that the
Legislature "implicitly" intended that the record be made by certified shorthand
reporters rather than by electronic recording. 166

162. Id.
I63. See id. The Turner opinion, issued November 20, 1998, does not indicate the
date of the superior court proceeding that appellant claimed was electronically recorded
in violation of his constitutional and statutory rights. For purpose of context, recall the
chronology: CCRA I was decided on October 1995, Judge Garcia issued his injunction in
November 1996, the Judicial Council repealed the Electronic Recording Rules and
issued its directive prohibiting the expenditure of state funds to operate and maintain
electronic recording equipment to make the official superior court record in January
1997, and CCRA II affirmed Judge Garcia's injunction on December 3, 1997. See supra
Part II.C.1-2.
I 64. The Turner court noted that a criminal defendant appearing in propria persona
must be apprised of his right, under In re Annstrong, 178 Cal. Rptr. 902 (Ct. App. 1981),
to a verbatim record-but not necessarily to a verbatim record prepared by shorthand.
See Turner, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 743 ("We conclude that appellant has failed to
demonstrate a violation of constitutional proportions merely because an electronic
recording device was employed instead of a certified shorthand reporter."). The court
pointed out, however, that "a verbatim record is implicitly among the rights of which a
defendant appearing in propria persona must be apprised." Id. at 745.
165. Id. at 744.
I66. Id. (citations omitted).
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4.

The "Unpublished" View from the Fourth Appellate District:
Gandall v. Grimes (August 1998)

In Gandall v. Grimes, 161 an unpublished opinion168 decided eight
months after CCRA 11, the Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld the
use of electronic recording to ma.lee a verbatim record in a civil case in
Orange County Superior Court, relying squarely on the fifth appellate
district's IACRAA decision. Gandall was the plaintiff in a malpractice
action. After losing at trial, Gandall argued "paradoxical[ly]" on appeal
16
essentially that he could not appeal ' -this because "the keeping of the
trial record via electronic recording denie[ d] him his right to appeal." 110
Gandall claimed that he had agreed to the electronic recording of the
trial proceedings in reasonable reliance on the Judicial Council's
Electronic Recording Rules without knowing that the Rules had been
invalidated in CCRA 1. 111 The Fourth District Court of Appeal both
affirmed the lower court ruling and "reject[ed] [the] plaintiffs efforts to
torpedo his own appeal." 172 The court also stated that, notwithstanding
CCRA 1, the electronic recording was "permissible" under the fifth
appellate district's LA CRAA decision, since "[n]either the litigants nor
the court here requested shorthand reporting under Code of Civil
Procedure section 269 or otherwise." 173 The court further held that
"nothing in the rules of appellate practice, as best we can discern,
precludes the use of electronic recordings in the production of reporter's
transcripts for purposes of appeal." 174
The Gandall decision represents a rather bold statement about
electronic recording. Note that the CCRA I opinion was rendered after
Gandall's trial but before his appeal."' Therefore, the Fourth District

167. No. 0017121 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1998).
168. In California, not all appellate opinions are published. A court of appeal may
decide not to certify an opinion for publication because it fails to meet the requirements
for publication set forth in Rule 976 of the California Rules of Court. An unpublished
opinion may "not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other action" except as
otherwise provided in Rule 977(b). CAL. R. Cr. 977(a). Opinions that a court of appeal
certifies for publication may be depublished by order of the California Supreme Court
pursuant to Rule 976(c) and 979. CAL. R. Cr. 976(c), 979. For a critical analysis of the
Supreme Court's depublication practice, see generally Stephen R. Barnett. Making
Decisions Disappear: Depublication and Stipulated Reversal in the California Supreme
Court, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1033 (1993).
169. Gandall, slip op. at 3.
170. Id. at 2.
171. See id. "[Gandall's attorney] [did] not question the accuracy or veracity of the
reporter's transcripts" that were derived from the videotape. Id. at 5.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 4.
174. Id. at 5.
175. See id. at 3.
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Court of Appeal could have affirmed the trial court's use of electronic
recording on a narrow basis that avoided any reliance on IACRAA. The
trial court had electronically recorded Gandall's trial proceedings
pursuant to the authority granted superior courts by the Judicial
Council's Electronic Recording Rules which had not yet been
invalidated by the CCRA I decision. The court of appeal could have
simply refused to apply CCRA I retroactively. Instead, the fourth
appellate district court chose to make a statement-albeit an unpublished
one-about the legality of using electronic recording in superior court in
the aftermath of CCRA I and II and the repeal of the Electronic
Recording Rules. Indeed, the court characterized CCRA I as a "dubious"
decision 176 and narrowly confined its holding, writing:
The precise holding in the dubious [CCRA I] decision is simply that the Judicial
Council lacked authority to promulgate rules concerning electronic reporting
once Code of Civil Procedure section 270 (which mandated the temporary
experimental use of electronic recording [under the "demonstration project"] in
certain superiorcourts)expired on January 1, 1994. 177

D. The Coincidence of the CCRA II Decision and the Advent
of State Funding of California Trial Courts Finally
Silences Electronic Recording in the Los Angeles
County Superior Courts

By the end of 1997, all sound recording of proceedings in Los Angeles
County Superior Court ceased, except in one courtroom. 178 That Los
Angeles County----of all counties in California-has effectively "thrown
in the towel" on electronic recording is ironic. The 1995 IACRAA
decision, based on the same statutes reviewed by the CCRA court,
expressly held that the Los Angeles County Superior Court practice of
176. Id. at 4.
177. Id. In an unpublished 1997 decision, rendered after the Judicial Council issued
its January 1997 directive but before the first appellate district decided CCRA II, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal rejected an attack-based on CCRA I-on the use of
electronic recording in Orange County Superior Court. See Garrett v. Superior Court,
No. G021612 (Cal. Ct. App. filed May 22, 1997). In Garrett, the Court denied, without
opinion, a petition for a writ of mandate to compel an Orange County Superior Court
judge, during a videotaped trial, "to perform [her] duty to maintain a proper record by a
court reporter," rather than by videotape. Petition for Writ of Mandate to Compel
Enforcement During Trial of the Legal Duty to Maintain a Proper Record by a Court
Reporter, or Other Appropriate Writ; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
Thereof at 3, Garrett (No. G021612).
178. See Jacobs, supra note 12, at BI.
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using electronic recording to make a record of general proceedings,
where neither party nor the court requested a certified shorthand
reporter, is not prohibited by statute. Electronic recording of superior
court proceedings in Los Angeles County survived the sunset of the
demonstration project in January 1994, survived the 1995 CCRA I
decision, survived Judge Garcia's November 1996 injunction, survived
the 1997 CCRA II decision, and even survived the Judicial Council's
January 1997 directive ordering superior courts to cease spending state
funds to support electronic recording to make the "official" record."' As
discussed below, the straw that finally broke the back of electronic
recording in Los Angeles County Superior Court was the enactment of
the landmark Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997. 180
Eight months after the Judicial Council directed the superior courts to
cease spending state funds to maintain and operate electronic recording
devices, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 233 (the LockyerIsenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997). The Act effectively shifted
responsibility for the funding of court operations from the counties to the
state effective July 1, 1997 .1' 1 Prior to this change,"' "the costs of court
179. As late as July 1996, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors "approved
four three-year contracts awarded by the Los Angeles Superior Court to firms that
currently provide electronic recording services in lieu of traditional shorthand court
reporters." Greene, supra note 11, at 5. Greene explains, ''The board voted unanimously

to approve the contracts for as-needed services over the objections of Los Angeles
Superior Court Reporters Association representatives, who asserted that the action puts
the county's 'imprimatur' on illegal expenditures of public funds." Id.
180. Ch. 850, 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4737 (West) (A.B. 233); see Rebecca Liss,
Court Workers Face Layoffs by New Year's, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 21, 1997, at I ("The
recent landmark reform in the state's trial court funding system may result in the
elimination of electronic recording of proceedings in Los Angeles Superior Courts come
Jan[ uary] I, and the layoff of approximately 80 monitors who operate the equipment.").
The Judicial Council urged the Legislature to enact state funding to promote judicial
self-governance. See Ronald M. George, Message from the Chief Justice (visited Apr.
15, 1998) <http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courtnews/10961196/message.htm>. The Chief
Justice wrote:
Since I became Chief Justice five months ago, I have focused on many
critical issues .... My top priority, however, has been the establishment of a
stable and adequate funding source for the California trial courts that will
permit our justice system to effectively serve the people of this state .
. . . [T]he Judicial Council is taking every possible step to tum state trial
court funding into a reality this year ....
Id.; see also Ronald M. George, Message from the Chief Justice: Courts Are Leading the
Move to Restore Public Confidence in the Judicial System, CT NEWS-JUD. COUNCIL OF
CAL., Feb.-Mar. 1997, at 2 ("Funding and self-governance: As we enter the 21st century,
the most crucial issue looming before the judiciary is stable funding for the trial courts,
which is inexorably linked to the courts' ability to be independent and self-governing.").
An unintended consequence of state funding was to undermine judicial self-governance
to the extent that state funding deprived courts of the ability to control their own record.
181. See Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997, ch. 850, sec. 46, art. 3,
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operations were shared between the state and the counties. " 183 In
essence, Assembly Bill 233 "relieves counties of any direct
responsibility to fund trial court operations costs." 184
The mechanism of the Act is somewhat elaborate. First, each county
is required to remit to the state a set amount of money which is "based
on an amount expended by the respective county for court operations
during the 1994-95 fiscal year. " 1" The funds so remitted by the counties
to the state are deposited in the State Trial Court Trust Fund. After the
Legislature makes its annual appropriation to the Judicial Council,
"based on the recommendations of the Trial Court Budget Commission,
as approved by the Judicial Council,""' the Judicial Council allocates
1
appropriated funds among the respective counties. " Each county then
deposits the state funds into a special Trial Court Operations Fund,
within the county treasury, "which ... operate[s] as a special revenue
fund." 188 Ultimately, these state-allocated funds cover the costs of local
court operations.
In the aftermath of the funding legislation, the County of Los Angeles
reassessed the practice of electronic court reporting. The County, facing
various limitations imposed by the new funding system, expressed
concern over the high cost of salaried persons called "monitors" used in
the sound recording process. 1" At some point, the Los Angeles County
§ 77200, 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 4754 ("Article 3 ... is added ... to read ... § 77200.
On and after July 1, 1997, the state shall assume sole responsibility for the funding of
court operations ....").
182. See ch. 850, sec. 27, § 68073, 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 4745. This document
reads:
Section 68073 of the Government Code is amended to read:
... Commencing July I, 1997, and each year thereafter, no county or city
and county shall be responsible to provide funding for 'court operations' as
defined in Section 77003 and Rule 810 of the California Rules of Court as it
read on July 1, 1996.
Id.
183. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ASSEMBLY BILL 233 COMMENTARY
48 (1997).
184. Id. at 49.
185. Ch. 850, sec. 46, art. 3, § 77201, 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 4754.
186. Ch. 850, sec. 46, art. 3, § 77202, 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 4761.
187. See ch. 850, sec. 46, art. 3, § 77207, 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 4763 ("The
Legislature shall appropriate trial court funding. The Controller shall apportion trial
court funding payments to the courts pursuant to an allocation schedule adopted by the
Judicial Council in four quarterly installments.").
188. Ch. 850, sec. 44, § 77009, 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. at 4753.
189. See Liss, supra note 180, at I ('"If we don't find a way to pay for the
electronic recording monitors with money other than that from the state, we will have to
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Board of Supervisors apparently became unwilling to appropriate the
two million dollars in excess of the county's required contribution to the
State Trial Court Trust Fund to continue the practice of electronic
recording in superior court. 190 Los Angeles County superior court
administrators also believed that Judge Garcia's injunction and the
Judicial Council directive forbade them from spending state funds to
1 1
finance electronic recording ' and, after July 1, 1997, state monies
became the only available source of funding for the courts in Los
Angeles County. For these reasons, in 1998 the Los Angeles County
Superior Court hired fifty additional court reporters to replace electronic
recording equipment. 192
Interestingly, Orange County took a different path, choosing to
continue to utilize electronic court reporting. Why is the situation
different in Orange County? The answer is that video, rather than sound,
recording equipment was installed in Orange County superior courts in
the waning years of the demonstration project. Video recording
equipment is cheaper to operate than sound recording equipment
because it does not require the use of salaried court monitors-this
because speakers in court are visually self-identified without the need of
a monitor to keep a log. 1" As long as the video recording equipment
does not break down, its operation is affordable enough to be supported
194
by county funds and user fees.
hire more court reporters,' [Los Angeles Superior Court Presiding Judge] Parkin said.").
190. See id. at I. Liss reported:
In order to continue using the electronic recording systems for the
remainder of the fiscal year, the court needs to come up with $2 million in
funds not supplied by the state, according to Los Angeles Superior Court
Presiding Judge Robert W. Parkin.
Parkin said ... that unless the money is found in the next six weeks, 35
county workers and an additional 45 contract workers will lose their jobs by
New Year's Day .
. . . The [electronic recording] system costs approximately $4 million per
fiscal year to operate in 80 courtrooms.
Id.

191. See Telephone Interview with Juanita Blankenship, Administrator, Litigation
Support Services, Los Angeles Superior Court (Jan. 5, 1999).
192. See Ruling Barring Electronic Court Reporting Will Cost Superior Court $5.5
Million Annually, METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE; CAPITOL NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 16,
1998, at I.
193. See Miller, supra note 26, at I (''The California Judicial Council, in a 1992
report to the Legislature on several pilot projects, estimated that each video-recorded
courtroom could save about $41,000 per year, and each audio-recorded courtroomwhich requires an employee to monitor the equipment----<:ould save about $28,000
annually.").
194. See Memorandum from Alan Slater, Executive Officer, Clerk of the Orange
County Superior Court, to Hon. Kathleen E. O'Leary, Presiding Judge et al. (Jan. 7,
1998) (on file with author). Slater wrote:
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On September 27, 1999, Orange County Superior Court terminated the
use of electronic recording equipment to make the official verbatim
record in general jurisdiction proceedings, but not because it believed
electronic recording of superior court proceedings is illegal. In August
1999, the Judicial Council made the court an offer it could not refuse in
the form of a $1,132,176 subsidy to re-hire sixteen court reporters to
replace electronic recording equipment that has been functioning well in
thirteen Orange County courtrooms for almost a decade. 1" Statewide,
the Judicial Council allocated a total of $8,009,935 in fiscal year 19992000 to turn back the clock, technologically, in California courtrooms
pursuant to the Judicial Council's "ER/Verbatim Reporting Conversion
Program." 196
The final nail in the coffin of electronic recording in Orange County
The Judicial Council has in fact, based on the op1mon in CCRA I,
expressly forbidden the use of State funds to support "electronic recording"
(ER). In response to this directive this court has relied on county funds to
support our ER program. Despite the shift from primary county funding to
primary state funding which has now occurred with the passage of AB233, it is
my opinion that sufficient funding from local revenue sources will be available
to allow this court to maintain current video recording systems. Other trial
courts which have employed audio electronic recording monitors (ERMs) to
manage their audio electronic systems find themselves in the unfortunate
position of having no authorized funds with which to pay the salaries,
employee benefits or contract fees of those individuals serving as ERMs,
unless a county Board of Supervisors voluntarily opts to continue county
funding. Similarly, no authorized funding is available to replace the audio
systems with the more cost effective video recording systems. Ironically,
funding for the additional use of CSRs to replace ER Systems is not available
in the current State allocation for the balance of [fiscal year] 1997 /98, nor is it
included in the budgets tentatively approved by the Judicial Council and
submitted to the Governor for funding in [fiscal year] 1998/99.
Therefore, the current situation regarding the use of our JAVS Video
Court Documentation Systems seems quite different than that which other
courts might be facing. Since the systems were all previously purchased and
we do not employ or need ERMs to operate our video recording systems, I
believe we will be able to sustain our video recording systems in their current
configuration without using state funds. However, in the future, we may not
be able to replace a system if it should fail or need the replacement of critical
components.
Id. at 2-3.
195. See Proposed Trial Court Funding Allocations for Fiscal Year 1999-2000
(unpublished table) (on file with author); see also Letter from Marlene Nelson,
Executive Director, Fiscal Services, Orange County Superior Court, to author (July 28,
1999) (on file with author).
196. See Proposed Trial Court Funding Allocations for Fiscal Year 1999-2000,
supra note 195.
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Superior Court was the formal request to the court by California's
Administrative Director of the Courts to "cease its use of any electronic
recording for purposes of creating the official verbatim record, except in
197
limited civil cases, misdemeanors, and infractions."
The price-tag to
California taxpayers for rehiring court reporters to sit in courtrooms
198
wired to electronically record proceedings was $8,009,935.
The cost
in terms of judicial independence is incalculable.
III. THE CURRENT LEGAL STATUS OF ELECTRONIC RECORDING IN
CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURT
Detailed analysis of the statutes and decisions leads to the conclusion
that CCRA I is wrongly decided and should be either disavowed by other
courts of appeal or, alternatively, narrowly construed to avoid conflict
with LACRAA. This section develops these points in three subsections.
First, Part III.A describes the conflict between the holding of CCRA I, as
broadly construed in CCRA II, and the LACRAA decision.
Next, Part III.B summarizes an earlier critique of the CCRA

197. Letter from William C. Vickrey to Kathleen E. O'Leary, supra note 16, at 2;
see Memorandum from Kathleen E. O'Leary to Judges Bauer et al., supra note 14, at 12. Referring Lo the Judicial Council's formal request that Orange County Superior Court
terminate electronic recording to make the official record in general jurisdiction
proceedings, Judge O'Leary states, in part:
This most recent communication [from William C. Vickrey, Administrative
Director of the Courts] clearly indicates for the first time that in the opinion of
the Executive and Planning Committee, speaking for the Judicial Council
pursuant to CCRC, rule 6.11 (d), that our current practices with respect to the
funding of electronic recording through locally generated revenue is
"inconsistent with the judgment" against the Judicial Council in CCRA II. ...
While reasonable minds can differ as to the propriety of the use of
electronic recording and some may believe that the request from the Judicial
Council does not constitute a mandate upon the court or any individual judge, I
believe that we should comply with the Judicial Council's request that we
cease our use of any electronic recording for purposes of creating the official
record, except in limited civil cases, misdemeanors and infractions....
Regardless of the opinion of individual judicial officers as to the propriety
of the use of electronic recording, I think all of the judicial officers of this
court would agree that the use and funding of electronic recording has long
been a source of controversy in our court. I think efforts to prolong the
argument and to allow the controversy in our court to continue is not in
anyone's best interest.
Id.

198. See supra note 195. Judge O'Leary acknowledged that many Orange County
judges question the wisdom of spending over a million dollars to re-convert Orange
County courtrooms to court reporters but noted that "[t]he question as to whether these
funds could be put to better use is not ours to answer." Memorandum from Kathleen E.
O'Leary to Judges Bauer et al., supra note 14, at I.

88

[VOL. 37: 47, 2000]

A Tale of Two Counties
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

decisions'" and demonstrates that the superior courts do not require
express statutory authorization to use electronic recording to make a
verbatim record. Part IILB discusses and endorses the analysis of Judge
Staniforth, whose judgment upholding the validity of the Judicial
Council's Electronic Recording Rules was reversed in CCRA /. Under
this analysis, which uses section 69941 of the California Government
Code as its starting point, superior courts are not required to appoint any
official reporters. Section 69941 merely authorizes superior courts to
appoint official reporters. Therefore, superior courts may choose to
utilize electronic means to record proceedings whenever an official
reporter is "unavailable" or when neither party requests an official
reporter. Under this line of reasoning, a superior court retains the option
to electronically record proceedings in lieu of an official reporter, even
where a party requests an official reporter, as long as the court finds that
an official reporter is "unavailable. " 200
Finally, Part IILC provides an alternative approach that reconciles
CCRA I and LACRAA by narrowly construing the holding of CCRA I.
This analysis adopts LACRAA's statutory interpretation of the court
reporting statutes, which is a bit broader than Judge Staniforth' s but still
much narrower than CCRA I's interpretation. LA CRAA' s statutory
interpretation, like CCRA J's,2°' begins with section 269(a) of the
California Code of Civil Procedure but, unlike CCRA I, LACRAA
interprets section 269(a) literally to "require[] . . . that the official
reporter 'take down' civil proceedings only if requested by either party
or the judge; the official reporter need not 'take down' a record when no
request is made." 202 Under LACRAA's statutory analysis, the superior
court's discretion is more limited than under Judge Staniforth's analysis.
LACRAA interprets section 269(a) to oblige the superior court to provide
an official reporter when requested by a party. Under UCRAA's
analysis, a superior court cannot use electronic recording to make the
record in lieu of an official reporter where one is requested. Nothing in
LACRAA, however, prohibits a superior court from using electronic
recording in addition to a requested official reporter.

199. For an expanded critique of the CCRA decisions, see Koppel, Push-Comes-toShove, supra note 20, at 140-86.
200. Repealed Rule 980.3 defined "unavailability" broadly. See supra note 122.
20 I. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
202. Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d
341, 344 (Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added).
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A.

The Conflict Between CCRA I, as Construed by
CCRA II, and LACRAA

In CCRA II, the first appellate district broadly construed its own
holding in CCRA I that places CCRA I in direct conflict with the holding
of the fifth appellate district in LACRAA. As construed in CCRA II,
CCRA I holds that the use of electronic recording under any
circumstances to make the official verbatim record of superior court
proceedings is inconsistent with statute. 203 Under LACRAA's holding, it
is not inconsistent with statute for a superior court to make an electronic
recording of general proceedings where neither party, nor the court,
requests the services of an official reporter. 204
Both CCRA I and LACRAA are based upon a review of the same
statutes.'°' Although the CCRA I court conceded that "there is no statute
[that] expressly prohibit[s] a superior court from making an official
record by electronic means," the court proceeded to find a "statutory
scheme [which] addresses the making of the official record in such a
manner as to suggest that the Legislature implicitly intended that this
record be made by certified shorthand reporters rather than by electronic
recording." 206 Such an implied statutory scheme that broadly preempts
judicial power over the court record is not articulated in legislative
history, and is contrary to the permissive statutory structure established
by the original 1861 court reporting statute that makes available to
courts and litigants technological options for making the court record. 201
The implied statutory scheme invented by the CCRA I court squarely
conflicts with LACRAA's narrow, literal, interpretation of the same court
reporting statutes. LACRAA holds that there is no
explicit or implicit legislative command contained in those specific statutes ...
[that prohibits superior courts] from choosing to maintain a record of general
civil proceedings by means of electronic recording devices where neither the
court nor any party requests that a verbatim record be taken by an official
shorthand reporter pursuant to the provisions of section 269.208

203. See CCRA II, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529, 531 (Ct. App. 1997).
204. See Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass 'n, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 349-50.
205. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
206. CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 51 (Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added).
207. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text..
208. Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass 'n, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 349-50
(emphasis added). For a summary of the LACRAA court's literal analysis of the same
statutes relied upon by the CCRA court, see supra note 127.
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B.

CCRA I Was Wrongly Decided and Should Not Be
Followed in Other Districts

CCRA I erroneously implied a statutory scheme that "suggests" a
fictional legislative intent (1) to prevent local superior courts from
exercising their inherent power to determine whether and how to prepare
a verbatim record of proceedings, and (2) to preempt the Judicial
Council's exercise of its constitutional authority to promulgate rules of
court that provide a uniform statewide policy re~lating the use of
electronic recording to make a superior court record.
Superior courts require no express statutory authorization to use
electronic recording to make a verbatim record. No statute expressly
prohibits a superior court from using electronic recording technology to
make a verbatim record, nor does any statute require the superior court
210
to make an "official record. "
The phrase "official verbatim record"
was introduced into California's legal lexicon by California Rule of
Court 980.3, 211 which rule CCRA I held to be invalid. 212 In addition to
authorizing electronic recording in superior court, Rule 980.3 imposed
on superior courts "an obligation to maintain an adequate record of oral
209.

See CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 55. The court wrote,
The fact that the Legislature has by statute authorized electronic recording
in some contexts suggests strongly that-unless the existing statutory scheme
providing for the official record to be taken down in shorthand is amendedthe Legislature does not intend that electronic recording of superior court
proceedings be the method of creating an official record.

Id.

210. Statutory law does not refer to a verbatim record of proceedings prepared by
an official reporter as "the official record." See, e.g., CAL. CN. PROC. CODE§ 269 (West
Supp. 1999) (''The official reporter . . . shall . . . take down in shorthand all
testimony .... "); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE§ 273(a) (West Supp. 1999) (''The report of the
official reporter ... is prima facie evidence of [the] testimony and proceedings."); CAL.
Gov'TCODE 69952(a) (West Supp. 1999) (''The court may specifically direct the making
of a verbatim record .... "); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 69955(a) (West 1997) ("Reporting
notes are official records of the court."). A 1997 amendment to section 273 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure, which amendment makes an official reporter's
certified transcript "prima facie evidence" of the testimony and proceedings in the case,
introduced the phrase "official certified transcript." Act of Aug. 2, 1997, ch. 183, sec. 1,
§§ 273(a), (b), 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. 640, 641 (West) (A.B. 1372). This amendment
provides that a rough draft of the official reporter's transcript "shall not be certified and
cannot be used ... as the official certified transcript of the proceedings." Id. (emphasis
added). Therefore, it appears that "official certified transcript" means that transcript
which is accorded prima facie evidence status under section 273 of the California Code
of Civil Procedure.
211. CAL. R. CT. 980.3 (1996) (repealed 1997).
212. See CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 56.
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proceedings [the 'official verbatim record of oral proceedings'] to permit
reference and, when necessary, appellate review."213 When the Judicial
Council repealed Rule 980.3, pursuant to Judge Garcia's injunction, the
rule's requirement that a superior court maintain an official verbatim
record died with it.
CCRA I used section 269(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure
as the keystone of its statutory analysis to suggest greater legislative
intrusion into the field of court recording than is warranted by a literal
reading of the applicable statutes. CCRA J's analysis emphasized the
concept of an "official record"-nowhere required by statute-which
must be made by an official reporter, unless otherwise expressly
214
provided by statute.
To reinforce this broad statutory scheme, the
CCRA court cited other statutes that regulate aspects of the office of
official reporter, such as fees and salary, and that make the official
reporter's certified transcript prima facie evidence (but not the only
evidence) of the trial proceedings."' The court interpreted the two
instances of express, but limited, statutory authorization of electronic
21
recording ' as evidence of a legislative intent that any further extension
of electronic recording be expressly authorized by statute. 21 '
The logical starting point for an analysis of the statutory structure
pertaining to court reporting is section 69941 of the California
Government Code.
This code section authorizes-but does not
require-superior courts to appoint official reporters and provides

213. CAL. R. CT. 980.3(a) (1996) (repealed 1997), quoted in CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr.
2d at48 n.12.
214. See supra note 209.
215. See supra note 132.
216. These two instances are section 270 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
and section 72194.5 of the California Code of Government. Section 270, which expired
on January I, 1994, authorized the Judicial Council to "establish a demonstration project
to assess the costs, benefits, and acceptability of utilizing audio and video recording as a
means of producing a verbatim record of proceedings in up to 75 superior court
departments" and provided that, in demonstration courtrooms, "audio or video recording
may be used in lieu of the verbatim record prepared by a court reporter except in any
criminal or juvenile proceedings." CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 270(a), (b) (West Supp.
1999). Section 72194.5, enacted in 1975 to address a critical shortage of court reporters
in municipal court, authorized the municipal courts to use electronic recording
"[ w]henever an official court reporter or a temporary court reporter is unavailable to
report an action or proceeding." CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 72194.5 (West Supp. 1999). See
generally notes 65-72, 81-85 and accompanying text.
217. See CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54. The court stated:
[W]henever the Legislature has intended that electronic recording be
permitted, it has expressed that intent by specific statutory authorization. This
legislative pattern suggests that while electronic recording is sometimes
proper, the normal practice is that a shorthand reporter is to create the official
record unless statutory law provides otherwise.
Id. (citation omitted).
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judges and litigants the option to employ the official reporter's
services."' The applicability of the remaining statutes cited in CCRA I,
including section 269(a) (which prescribes the duty of an official
reporter to take down proceedings in shorthand upon request of a party
or the court),"' depends upon the court's appointment of an official
reporter under section 69941 and upon a party's or the judge's request
that an official reporter make a verbatim record. 220
The two limited instances in which the Legislature has expressly
authorized electronic recording are not exceptions that prove the
existence of an all-encompassing statutory scheme that requires certified
court reporters to make the "official" record. 221 There is no such all218. See CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 69941 (West 1997); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE§ 269(a)
(West Supp. 1999). This approach is consistent with the analysis of Judge Robert 0.
Staniforth, whose trial court judgment sustained the validity of the Judicial Council's
Electronic Recording Rules. Judge Staniforth's judgment was reversed by the First
District Court of Appeal in CCRA I. See CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 56.
219. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 269(a) (West Supp. 1999).
220. Judge Staniforth explained:
The appointment and selection of official reporters is by specific language
of the statute a permissive, a discretionary function of the superior court judge.
Thus, [section] 69941 should not be read to require the appointment of official
reporters as the sole means for making official verbatim reporters [sic] of oral
proceedings in the superior court. Had the Legislature intended mandatory
appointment, it could have easily done so.
. . . Particularly in light of Government Code [s]ection 69941, [s]ection
269 cannot be read to mandate the appointment of an official reporter, nor does
it govern the making of the official verbatim record of oral proceedings before
the court where a court reporter is not available. I conclude Code of Civil
Procedure [s]ection 269 does not require a contrary interpretation of [s]ection
69941.
Statement of Intended Decision 21-23, California Court Reporters Ass'n v. Judicial
Council (Alameda County Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 1994) (No. 728173-6) (citations omitted).
221. LACRAA interpreted section 270 of the California Code of Civil Procedure and
section 72194.5 of the California Code of Government as exceptions to the limited
statutory requirement in sections 269(a) and 274(c) of the California O:ide of Civil
Procedure, respectively, that "a verbatim record be taken by an official reporter ...
where the judge or a party requested such a record." Los Angeles County Court
Reporters Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341, 345-47 (Ct. App. 1995).
LACRAA 's literal interpretation of section 270 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
is supported by an Informal Opinion of the California Attorney General's Office. This
document states:
Nothing in section 270 indicates that the Legislature intended to limit the
authority of the courts or departments not engaged in the demonstration project
to provide for a record of its proceedings which may be authorized by other
provisions of law ....
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encompassing statutory scheme. Furthermore, the Legislature's failure
to expressly authorize by statute electronic recording in superior court
does not, a fortiori, support an inference that the Legislature intends to
prevent such practice or intends to preempt the Judicial Council in this
area.
C.

Alternatively, CCRA I Should Be Narrowly Confined to Its
Facts to Provide Breathing Room for LACRAA

An alternative to directly disavowing CCRA I is to disavow CCRA II' s
broad construction of the holding in CCRA I that conflicts with
IACRAA. This alternative would allow a court of appeal to align itself
with the holding in IACRAA that statutory law does not prohibit a
superior court from "choosing to maintain a record of general civil
proceedings by means of electronic recording devices where neither the
court nor any party requests that a verbatim record be taken by an
official shorthand reporter pursuant to the provisions of section 269."222
Recall that CCRA II broadly interpreted CCRA I's holding to prohibit
"the creation of an official superior court record by electronic means
22
under any circumstances." ' Clearly this broad holding conflicts with
IACRAA's holding that the use of electronic recording to make a
verbatim record in superior court is permissible when neither the judge
nor a party requests an official reporter. 224
We conclude that there is no requirement for the attendance of a court
reporter in any superior court proceeding except a criminal proceeding and a
juvenile court proceeding before a juvenile court judge in the absence of a
request by a party or an order of the court.
Letter from Jack R. Winkler, Assistant Attorney General, Chief of Opinion Unit, Office
of John K. Van De Kamp, Attorney General, to Frank S. Zolin, County Clerk - Executive
Officer, The Superior Court for Los Angeles County 2-3 (Jan. 4, 1989). The letter was
in response to "a request for an Attorney General's opinion on behalf of the judges of the
Personnel and Budget Committee of the Los Angeles County Superior Court." Id. at 1.
222. Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass 'n, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 349-50
(emphasis added).
223. CCRA II, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529, 531 (Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added).
224. Although CCRA I acknowledged the lACRAA opinion several times, CCRA I
did not seriously attempt to reconcile the two decisions. Consider, for example, the
following language from CCRA I referring to the IACCRA decision:
One court has held that section 269 does not require that the official
reporter make the record of superior court proceedings, unless requested by a
party or the judge. This conclusion is consistent with the opinion of the
Legislative Counsel holding that section 269 requires that superior court
proceedings be taken down by an official shorthand reporter if a request is
made.
CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 52 (Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted). Also referring to the
LA CCRA decision, the court wrote:
We are aware that the [f)ifth [d]istrict recently considered the propriety of
the Los Angeles Superior Court's practice of using electronic recording
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There is a very reasonable and defensible interpretation of CCRA I
that is more narrow than that adopted in CCRA II. This more narrow
construction is simply that the Judicial Council's Electronic Recording
Rules were inconsistent with statute and, therefore, an invalid exercise of
the Judicial Council's rulemaking power under article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution. The Electronic Recording Rules might be
said to have exceeded the superior court's statutory authorization (as
held in IACRAA) on at least two grounds. First, the Electronic
Recording Rules arguably exceeded statutory authority by purportedly
authorizing electronic recording as a means of making the "official
verbatim record of oral proceedings."22' CCRA I and II consistently use
the term "official" record to distinguish its holding from IACRAA's. 226
The term "official" record also circumscribes the scope of both Judge
Garcia's injunction22' and the Judicial Council's directive.'" The Los
devices when there was no request that a certified shorthand reporter record
those proceedings. It evaluated many of the statutes that CCRA now urges us
to find comprise a statutory scheme-sections 269, 270 and 273; Government
Code sections 68086, 69941, 69942, 69952, 69953 and 72194.5-but did not
find these provisions established that the use of electronic recording was
prohibited in superior courts if the parties or the judge did not request a
certified shorthand reporter to make a record. Instead, it found these
provisions to be consistent with section 269. The court characterized its
holding as "very narrow"-"the court is not prohibited, by any explicit or
implicit legislative command contained in those specific statutes cited by [the
local association of certified shorthand reporters], from choosing to maintain a
record of general civil proceedings by means of electronic recording devices
where neither the court nor any party requests that a verbatim record be taken
by an official shorthand reporter pursuant to the provisions of section 269."
The Fifth District specifically declined to address certain other issues that
CCRA, in an amicus brief. urged it to decide. Some of those issues are
presented in our case.
Id. at 55 n.19 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
225. CAL. R. CT. 980.3 (1996) (repealed 1997) (emphasis added).
226. See, e.g., CCRA I, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 55 ("[T]he Legislature does not intend
that electronic recording of superior court proceedings be the method of creating an
official record."); CCRA II, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 531 ("The holding of CCRA I is a simple
one: The Legislature has not authorized the creation of an official superior court record
by electronic means under any circumstances.").
227. See California Court Reporters Ass'n v. Judicial Council, No. 728173-6, slip
op. at 1-2 (Alameda County Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 1996). The court wrote:
2. It is HEREBY DECLARED that the use of nonstenographic methods
for producing the OFFICIAL verbatim record of superior court proceedings are
contrary to the intent of the Legislative [sic].
4. Furthermore, Respondent Judicial Council of California . . . [is J
HEREBY ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from authorizing and from causing
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Angeles Superior Court's gractice upheld in LACRAA did not employ
the term "official" record,'' and LACRAA's holding refers to a "record
of general civil proceedings" rather than "official record."230
Second, the Electronic Recording Rules arguably exceeded statutory
authority by stretching the definition of "unavailability." The Rules not
only authorized the electronic recording of superior court proceedings
when "the parties proceed with a hearing or trial in the absence of an
official court reporter ... without objection""' (which was consistent
with the practice of the Los Angeles Superior Court upheld in LACRAA),
but also authorized electronic recording to make the "official verbatim
record" 232 of superior court civil proceedings "when an official reporter
or official reporter pro tempore is unavailable."233 Rule 980.3(b) then
broadly defined "unavailability" to include
(2) when the court determines that the funds available for reporting services are
insufficient to employ a qualified person for the position at the prevailing
wage .... ; or
(3) when the court determines that a reporter will be unavailable based on the
court's existing staff of official court reporters, reasonable projections
concerning official reporters' vacations, sick leaves, and other approved
absences, and reasonable projections as to the workload in each of the court's
departments. 234

Put simply, this broad definition would not have been valid under
LACRAA's holding that requires the superior court to provide an official

reporter to a party who requests one.
Therefore, under this more narrow interpretation of CCRA I and under
the expenditure of public funds for the maintenance of or creation of a
nonstenographic method and system for preparing the official verbatim record
of superior court proceedings.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (emphasis added).
228. See Memorandum from William C. Vickrey to All Presiding and Sole Judges
of the Superior Courts et al., supra note 9, at 2. This memorandum states, "The Judicial
Council directs each superior court not to expend any of the upcoming [fiscal year] 9697 third quarter state funding distribution on the maintenance or creation of
nonstenographic methods for preparing the official verbatim record of superior court
proceedings." Id. (emphasis added).
229. See Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 341, 342-43 (Ct. App. 1995) ("The petition challenged the court's practice of
using electronic recording devices rather than certified court reporters to make a record
of general civil proceedings where neither the assigned judge nor the parties requested
that an official shorthand reporter record the proceedings.") (emphasis added).
230. Id. at 349-50 ("[T]he court is not prohibited ... from choosing to maintain a
record of general civil proceedings by means of electronic recording devices where
neither the court nor any party requests that a verbatim record be taken by official
shorthand reporter ....") (emphasis added).
231. CAL. R. CT. 980.3(c) (1996) (repealed 1997).
232. Id. 980.3(a).
233. Id. 980.3(b) (emphasis added).
234. Id.; see supra note 122.
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the clear holding of LACRAA, a superior court judge could make an
electronic record of proceedings as long as the electronic recording is
not called an "official record," and as long the court also provided an
official reporter to any party who requested one. Under LACRAA's
holding, state funds could legally be spent to maintain, and even expand,
electronic recording facilities in superior courts without violating CCRA
II, Judge Garcia's injunction,"' or the Judicial Council's January 1997
directive236---each of which prohibits the expenditure of public funds to
electronically prepare the "official" record. 237 Until recently, Orange
County Superior Court relied on limited county funds and user fees 238 to
235. See supra notes 45 & 47 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 48.
237. Local courts can reallocate their "baseline" state funding. Therefore, with
some exceptions, local superior courts have the flexibility to reallocate monies allocated
by the Trial Court Budget Commission ("TCBC") for Court Operations Baseline Budget
to operate and maintain electronic recording technology. See Letter from Marlene
Nelson to author, supra note 195 ("[T]he Court has the ability to allocate and reallocate
state provided funds as a general rule with a few exceptions."). However, the TCBC sets
aside certain funds from a county-wide trial court system's baseline allocation that are
earmarked for specific programs, like the Court Interpreter Program or the ER/Verbatim
Reporting Conversion Program. If these earmarked funds are not spent for the specific
purpose provided, they revert back to the State Trial Court Trust Fund. See id.
Apparently, in shutting down its electronic recording equipment, the Los Angeles
Superior Court mistakenly concluded that sound recording of superior court proceedings
constituted an "official" record and, therefore, state funds could not be spent to support
electronic recording of superior court proceedings. Under this Article's analysis of the
applicable statutes and case law, the Judicial Council could allocate funds statewide for
the maintenance and operation of electronic recording equipment to provide a record of
proceedings, so long as the record is not the official record. For political reasons,
however, the Council has moved away from electronic recording by increasing the
allocation of funds earmarked for the ER/Verbatim Reporting Conversion Program.
238. The issue whether a county or county superior court has the authority to charge
a user fee for court services turns on whether the Legislature has "so fully covered by
general law matters relating to fees ... that it must be considered a matter of state
concern." Hogoboom v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 254, 257 (Ct. App. 1996). In
Hogoboom, the Second District Court of Appeal held that "the Legislature has
preempted the right of a superior court to charge fees for family law and domestic
violence mediation other than those specifically enumerated by statewide statute." Id.
Hogoboom was distinguished by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Lu v. Superior
Court, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 561 (Ct. App. 1997). In Lu, the court rejected petitioner's
contention that Hogoboom prohibits the Orange County Superior Court from requiring
petitioner to pay a fee to a discovery referee appointed by the court. Lu confined
Hogoboom's holding to the imposition of "a fee for the use of court operated mediation
facilities in family law and domestic violence cases." Id. at 566. The court stated:
The [Hogoboom] court based its holding upon the conclusion state law
preempted the field of fees which may be charged by courts in the areas of
family law and domestic violence .... Hogoboom is also based on Government
Code section 68070, subdivision (a)(!) which prohibits a court from enacting
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operate and maintain its video recording equipment. 239 Los Angeles
County Superior Court could not finance its sound recording system
with county funds."0
IACRAA left undecided the legal status of an electronic record for
appeal purposes."' However, as correctly noted by the fourth appellate
district's unpublished opinion in Gandall v. Grimes,"' no appellate rule
local rules which impose "any ... charge ... upon any legal proceeding ...."
The court noted acts by the conciliation court are statutorily classified as
"proceedings," and mediation is statutorily required in cases involving issues
of custody or visitation. Neither condition exists here.
Id. ( citations omitted). A user fee charged to litigants for electronic recording services
provided by a superior court is not a "charge ... upon [a] legal proceeding." CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 68070(a)(l) (West Supp. 1999). Furthermore, the Legislature has not
preempted the superior courts from choosing to employ electronic recording devices to
prepare a verbatim record, see supra notes 209-20 and accompanying text, and,
therefore, has not preempted the superior courts from charging a user fee to cover the
cost of providing that service to litigants.
239. The Orange County Superior Court's former practice of spending locallygenerated revenue to fund electronic recording does not violate Judge Garcia's
injunction, which bars the expenditure of state funds to electronically record court
proceedings. Judge Garcia's judgment binds only the Judicial Council and the Alameda
County Superior Court. Although paragraph four of the injunction restrains the Judicial
Council "from authorizing and from causing the expenditure of public funds" to use
electronic recording to prepare the "official verbatim record," California Court Reporters
Ass'n v. Judicial Council, No. 728173-6 at 2 (Alameda County Super. Ct. Nov. I, 1996)
(emphasis added), the only funds the council allocates by law are state funds
appropriated by the Legislature. See supra notes 180-86 (concerning state trial court
funding). The 1997 Judicial Council directive barred superior court spending of state
funds to maintain electronic recording. See Memorandum from William C. Vickrey to
All Presiding and Sole Judges of the Superior Courts et al., supra note 9, at 1-2. In his
September 15, 1999 letter, William Vickrey, the Administrative Director of the Courts,
advised the Orange County superior court, for the first time, of the council's view that
the court's use of locally-generated revenue to support electronic recording violates
paragraph four of the injunction that restrains the council from "authorizing or causing
the expenditure of public funds" to support electronic recording. Letter from William C.
Vickrey to Kathleen E. O'Leary, supra note 16, at 2. Although the Administrative
Director requested, but did not formally direct, the Orange County Superior Court to
stop spending locally-generated revenues to videotape the official record, this "request"
amounts to an expansion of the council's authority to allocate state-appropriated funds to
include control over local court spending of locally-generated revenue. The implications
of this expansion for decentralized court administration in California are ominous. One
of the goals of the 1997 Isenberg-Lockyer Trial Court Funding Act was to preserve
"[l]ocal authority and responsibility of trial courts to manage day-to-day operations."
CAL. Gov'TCODE § 7700J(a) (West Supp. 1999).
240. See supra note I90 and accompanying text.
241. See Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 341, 350 (Ct. App. 1995) ("[W]e do not decide the purposes, if any, for which
the generated electronic recording may be used, because this question is outside the
scope of the discrete issue presented by the association's petition and evidence.").
Despite this reservation, the court made clear that electronic recording is not inconsistent
with statute where neither party, nor the court, requests the services of an official
reporter. See id. at 349-50.
242. No. 710153 (Cal. App. Ct. Aug. 26, 1998).
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prohibits the use of electronic recordings to prove the proceedings."'
The Gandall decision observed that California Rule of Court 4(d) of the
Appellate Rules, "which governs the preparation of a transcript for
appeal, simply requires that the reporter prepare and deliver to the court
clerk a transcript of the trial proceedings and 'certify it as correct. "'244
Although Rule 4(d) refers to a "reporter" (though not an "official"
reporter), Gandall treated the "duly designated court transcriber" who
prepared the transcript in that case as a "reporter" for purposes of
satisfying the requirements of Rule 4(d). 245
In addition to Rule 4(d) of the Appellate Rules, Rule 980.5 of the
California Rules of Court ("General Rules-All Courts"), which is
applicable "when a court has ordered proceedings to be electronically
recorded,"246 provides:
A transcript prepared and certified as provided in the preceding subdivision
[(f)], and accompanied by a certified copy of the monitor's certificate pertaining
to each reel transcribed, is prima facie a true and complete record of the oral
proceedings it purports to cover, and shall satisfy any requirement in these rules
or in any statute for a reporter's transcript of oral proceedings.247

No statute or appellate rule restricts proof of testimony and
243. An electronic recording or electronically-derived transcript satisfies the due
process right of a criminal defendant to "a record of sufficient completeness to permit
proper consideration of his appeal." People v. Turner, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 743 (Ct.
App. 1998) (quoting In re Armstrong, 178 Cal. Rptr. 902, 905 (Ct. App. 1981)).
244. Gandall, No. 710153, slip op. at 5 (Cal. App. Ct. Aug. 26, 1998) (quoting CAL.
R. CT. 4(d)).
245. Id. Note that the Judicial Council has the power to amend the appellate rules
to clarify, if necessary, that a certified transcriber qualifies as a "reporter" under Rule
4(d). In 1941, the Legislature delegated to the Judicial Council the authority to
promulgate rules governing appellate procedure that supersede pre-existing statute. See
CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE§ 901 (West 1980) ("The Judicial Council shall prescribe rules
for the practice and procedure on appeal not inconsistent with the provisions of this
title.").
246. CAL. R. CT. 980.5(a).
247. Id. 980.5(g). Rule 980.3, which authorized audio and video recording as a
means of making a verbatim record in superior court, was repealed effective January 31,
1997 pursuant to Judge Garcia's injunction. See id. 980.3 ( 1996) (repealed 1997). Rule
980.5(g), however, is still in effect. See id. 980.5. Also see Rule 980.5(i), which
provides that, upon stipulation of the parties, "the [original reels or electronic copies
thereof] satisfy the requirements in these rules or in any statute for a reporter's
transcript." Id. 980.5(i). Pursuant to Rule 980.5(i), the fourth appellate district, which
includes Orange County, promulgated a "Memorandum of Policy," dated May 8, 1991,
which "approves any such stipulation if the oral proceedings recorded on video tape are
one hour or less in duration." Memorandum of Policy, Office of the Clerk, Court of
Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three (May 8, 1991) (on file with author).
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proceedings in a case to the official reporter's certified transcript.
Section 273 of the California Code of Civil Procedure merely provides
that "[t]he report of the official reporter . . . when transcribed and
certified as being a correct transcript of the testimony and proceedings in
the case, is prima facie evidence of that testimony and proceedings." 248
However, by according a court reporter's certified transcript a
presumption of accuracy, section 273 does not thereby preclude the
admission of other forms of evidence to prove trial court testimony. 249
No statute precludes the admissibility on appeal of an electronic
recording, or a transcript derived from electronic recording, to prove trial
court testimony or to challenge the accuracy of any transcript derived
0
from shorthand. "
IV. CONCLUSION
The CCRA decisions were wrongly decided and should either be
disavowed or narrowly confined to their facts. The First District Court
of Appeal-not the Legislature-fabricated without justification an
implied statutory scheme that prevents the courts from utilizing
increasingly advanced technologies to efficiently allocate scarce judicial
resources and to provide litigants more affordable options to make a
verbatim record. The First District Court of Appeal has for no justifiable
reason thrown a monkey wrench into the wheels of progress. It is time
to recognize and reverse or mitigate the error.

248. CAL. C1v. PROC. CODE§ 273(a) (West Supp. 1999) (emphasis added).
249. A prior iteration of section 273(a), which was not adopted, provided that the
court reporter's "[r]eport ... shall for the purposes of making a statement upon motion
for new trial or appeal be conclusive of the facts therein stated." Act of May 17, 1861,
ch. 434, § 4, 1861 Cal. Stat. 497 (handwritten draft) (emphasis added) (on file with
author). For the text from another section of this document, see supra note 56.
250. See Los Angeles County Court Reporters Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 341,346 (Ct. App. 1995). The court wrote:
Section 273 does nothing more than create an evidentiary presumption.... If a
transcribed and certified report of the official reporter or official reporter pro
tempore is not obtainable because a request for such a record was not made
([section] 269), then the presumption would not be available to prove what
occurred in the proceeding. However, the absence of an official shorthand
record would not prohibit litigants from establishing the relevant event by
other legitimate means, such as by an admission or independent testimony.
Conversely, the existence of an official shorthand record would not bar the
presentation of evidence tending to demonstrate its inaccuracy. Moreover, an
official reporter's transcript is not required in every instance to perfect an
appeal; a settled statement or an agreed statement is, under specified terms and
conditions, an authorized substitute.
Id. (citations omitted).
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